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Crime and Punishment:
An Empirical Study of the Effects of
Racial Bias on Capital Sentencing
Decisions
MATTHEW A. GASPERETTI *
Racism has left an indelible stain on American history and
remains a powerful social force that continues to shape
crime and punishment in the contemporary United States. In
this article, I discuss the socio-legal construction of race,
explore how racism infected American culture, and trace the
racist history of capital punishment from the Colonial Era to
the present. After framing the death penalty in cultural and
historical context, I report original empirical results from
one of the largest studies (n = 3,284) of mock juror capital
sentencing decisions published to date. My results show that
mock jurors who self reported racial biases were 8.8% more
likely to pass the death qualification and were 18.3% to
18.4% more likely to sentence a Black defendant to death
than a White defendant with all other factors held constant.
Death qualifying the mock jury increased the probability of
empaneling one or more of these racially biased mock jurors
I completed a Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge in biological anthropology and a J.D. at Stanford Law School. My research focuses on the intersection
of human biology, culture, and law. I am extremely grateful to professors Susan
Sheridan, Jay Stock, Jeff Strnad, Erik Jensen, Debra Hensler, and the late John
Henry Merryman for their mentorship. This article is dedicated to the late Joan
Petersilia who inspired me to pursue this line of scholarship and the late Tripp
Zanetis who inspired me to follow my dreams. I would like to thank the University
of Miami Law Review for working with me on this article. This work originated
from research funded by the John M. Olin Fellowship in Law and Economics at
Stanford Law School. All views expressed, mistakes, and oversights in this article
are my own.
*
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by 8.4%. After reviewing these results in the context of previous research and Supreme Court jurisprudence, I argue
that death qualifying a capital jury violates an African
American defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury because the death qualification increases the likelihood of empaneling racially biased, partial jurors. Finally,
I argue that voir dire fails to provide an adequate safeguard
to this threat, argue that the right to inquire into juror racial
biases during voir dire should apply more broadly, and make
recommendations to improve current voir dire practices.
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INTRODUCTION
To understand capital punishment in the United States, which
has been widely criticized for decades for being used disproportionately to punish African Americans, it is important to contextualize
race, racism, and the death penalty in a cultural and historical perspective. 1 Racial groups, as they are conceptualized today, are pseudoscientific taxonomies that began to coalesce in their modern form
between the sixteenth and eighteen centuries. 2 Racism provided justification for colonization and the enslavement of indigenous populations. 3 In the centuries that followed, slavery became a major economic force in the American Colonies and later the United States. 4
Beginning in the seventeenth century, lawmakers passed statutes designed to keep the races separate, defined Whiteness and Blackness
at law, maintained a White social hierarchy through bondage and
violence, and executed Blacks for many offenses that did not carry
the same penalty for Whites. 5 Judicial and extra-judicial executions
frequently involved mutilation, dismemberment, and public display
of the dead. 6
After over 250 years of slavery and a war that cost more than
600,000 American lives, racism remained entrenched, continued to
be codified into law, and continued to be propagated through legal
See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Racial Discrimination and Capital Punishment:
The Indefensible Death Sentence of Duane Buck, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 20,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/racial-discrimination-andcapital-punishment-the-indefensible-death-sentence-of-duane-buck.
2
Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism
as a Social Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on the
Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCH. 16, 19 (2005).
3
Id. at 21–22.
4
JAMES OLIVER HORTON & LOIS E. HORTON, SLAVERY AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICA 1, 10–11 (2005).
5
IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
81–86 (10th Anniversary ed. 2006).
6
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE
LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR (3d ed. 2017), https://lynchinginamerica.eji.org/report/ (“Southern lynchings of African Americans were distinct from lynchings of
whites, and often featured extreme brutality such as burning, torture, mutilation,
and decapitation of the victim.”); see also CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M.
STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 26
(2016) (detailing the Supreme Court of the United States’ history of allowing capital punishment methods).
1
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institutions to oppress and control large Black populations, particularly in the South.7 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
White society maintained racist social norms through violence, murder, and state-sanctioned capital trials that denied African Americans due process. 8 The Civil Rights Movement was instrumental in
reforming these abuses. 9 After rebuffing numerous legal challenges
to death penalty statutes, the Supreme Court, in the 1976 case Furman v. Georgia, struck down the capital sentences imposed in three
cases. 10 In Furman, the Court implied that most, if not all, death
penalty statutes nationwide were unconstitutional. 11 Following a
brief moratorium, numerous states passed new capital sentencing
statutes. For example, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the reformed statutes in three different
states, thereby ushering in the modern era of the death penalty. 12
The Civil Rights Movement effectively curtailed de jure segregation; however, de facto social and economic segregation continued, resulting in the concentration of African American populations
in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods. 13 As industry moved overseas in the latter half of the twentieth century, White populations
abandoned urban areas, which exacerbated segregation and further
marginalized African American communities. 14 Heavy-handed policing, the War on Drugs, mass incarceration, and punitive sentencing policies compounded inner-city social problems and racial
David Theo Goldberg, The New Segregation, 1 RACE & SOC’Y 15, 20–21
(1998) (discussing what the author calls “Old Segregation”—“the classic variety
emerging in the U.S. in the 1880s” of being “separate but equal”—and “New Segregation”—“the ideological rationalization of . . . ‘unequal and therefore (to be)
separated’”).
8
STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 6, at 33–37 (using the example of Ed Johnson, “charged with the rape of a white woman,” who was convicted by an allwhite jury in Tennessee; when the United States Supreme Court accepted review
of his case, a mob removed Johnson from his cell and hanged and shot him—with
the sheriff’s permission).
9
Goldberg, supra note 7, at 17.
10
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
11
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.
12
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976); David C. Baldus et al.,
Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings From Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1638, 1648–1650 (1998).
13
Goldberg, supra note 7, at 16.
14
Id. at 18–21.
7
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discrimination. 15 These social forces destabilized African American
communities and created conditions conducive to crime, violence,
and murder. 16 Empirical research shows that crime is strongly correlated with economic disadvantage, not race. 17 Given this social reality and the intergenerational trauma caused by slavery, segregation, and discrimination, crime soared in African American communities in the late twentieth century. 18 Although there was a marked
decline in violent crime in the early twenty-first century, large
ethno-racial inequalities led to smaller relative declines in African
American neighborhoods, suggesting the crime gap between White
and Black neighborhoods is widening. 19
In 2019, 51.2% of those arrested for murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter were Black, as were 41.6% of death row inmates in
2020. 20 Yet, African Americans represent only 13.4% of the population. 21 Although many opponents of the death penalty view the per
capita over-representation of African Americans on death row as
Graham Boyd, The Drug War is the New Jim Crow, NACLA REP. AM.
(July/Aug. 2001), https://www.aclu.org/other/drug-war-new-jim-crow; Elizabeth
Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in
the Criminal Justice System, VERA INST. JUST. (May 2018), https://www.vera.
org/downloads/publications/for-the-record-unjust-burden-racial-disparities.pdf.
16
See generally Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1557–76 (2004) (proposing that the “pernicious” role racism plays “has significant implications for the ways we estimate fairness (as opposed to parity) in our analyses of death sentencing”).
17
Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban Crime, 75 SOC. FORCES 619, 619–20 (1996).
18
Rodney Andrews et al., Location Matters: Historical Racial Segregation
and Intergenerational Mobility, 158 ECON. LETTERS 67, 70–71 (2017).
19
Robert J. Sampson, Neighbourhood Effects and Beyond: Explaining the
Paradoxes of Inequality in the Changing American Metropolis, 56 URB. STUD. 3,
4–6 (2019); Lauren J. Krivo et al., The U.S. Racial Structure and Ethno-Racial
Inequality in Urban Neighborhood Crime, 2010–2013, SOCIO. RACE &
ETHNICITY 350, 350 (2021).
20
Estimated Number of Arrests by Offense and Race, 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr.asp?table_in=2 (last visited Nov. 10, 2021); DEBORAH FINS, DEATH ROW U.S.A.: FALL
2020, at 1 (2020) https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/DRUSAFall20
20.pdf (a quarterly report by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc.).
21
QuickFacts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219 (last visited Dec. 7, 2021).
15
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prima facie evidence that the criminal justice system is racially biased, this overrepresentation may also be attributable to unrelated
structural racism, economic marginalization, and elevated crime
rates in disadvantaged neighborhoods. 22 Convincingly demonstrating that disparities in capital trial outcomes are racially motivated
requires showing that a Black defendant is more likely to receive the
death penalty than a White defendant ceteris paribus. 23
Empirical research provides a powerful means of studying racial
bias, while controlling for other factors, and provides compelling
evidence that racism infects capital trials by influencing juror decision-making. In fact, research shows that a capital defendant is much
more likely to receive a death sentence if he or she is convicted of
killing a White victim. 24 Such race-of-victim bias is one of the most
consistent findings in empirical death penalty research. 25 On the
contrary, identifying race-of-defendant bias, which is a more powerful indicator of individualized bias, has proven more elusive. 26
Several meta-analyses of mock juror behavior report conflicting results with authors generally agreeing that race-of-defendant bias is
likely moderated by crime type, juror characteristics, methodological variation between studies, and other variables. 27
This study reports the results of a large-scale survey of 3,284
jury-eligible Americans conducted in November 2020. 28 I randomly
Baldus et al., supra note 12, at 1650–54.
Id.
24
Frank R. Baumgartner et al., #BlackLivesDon’tMatter: Race-of-Victim Effects in U.S. Executions, 1976–2013, 3 POL. GROUP. & IDENTITIES 209, 209
(2015).
25
Id. at 210.
26
See Justin D. Levinson et al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 513, 515–16 (2014).
27
See Laura T. Sweeney & Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179,
190–92 (1992); see also Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and
Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors: A Meta-Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCH. 1315, 1335–36 (1994); Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror
Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 621, 624–26 (2005); Dennis J. Devine & David E. Caughlin, Do
They Matter? A Meta-Analytic Investigation of Individual Characteristics and
Guilt Judgments, 20 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 109, 112 (2014).
28
See infra Appendix A.
22
23
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assigned mock jurors to treatment groups with the race of the defendant and victim varied in a 3 × 3 experimental design, yielding
nine defendant-victim combinations. I described the defendant as
White in the first defendant treatment and Black in the second and
third defendant treatments. I also depicted the defendant with a “police sketch” of a man with his complexion and eye color darkened
across treatment groups. For the victim treatments, I either omitted
the victim’s race, described him as White, or described him as
Black. After mock jurors answered disqualifying questions and provided demographic information, I death qualified the mock jury. Finally, I presented jury-eligible respondents with a description of a
homicide that occurred during a robbery and asked them to determine sentencing before answering a series of voir-dire-like screening questions designed to assess racial bias. In contrast to an actual
trial, I asked my voir dire questions after mock jurors determined
sentencing to avoid alerting respondents the study was about race.
The results showed that mock jurors who were more racially biased (as assessed by the voir dire questions), more politically conservative, and wealthier were more likely to pass the death qualification. 29 The death qualification also reduced the representation of
Black mock jurors and religious mock jurors in the death-qualified
venire. 30 Female respondents were more likely than male respondents to pass the death qualification, but death-qualified male respondents were significantly more likely to sentence a defendant to
death, as were mock jurors in older age groups. 31 Mock jurors who
failed the voir dire screening and those who identified as politically
moderate or conservative were not only over-represented in the
Demographic groups that were significantly more likely to pass the death
qualification included those who failed voir dire (8.8%, p < 0.001) relative to
those who passed; moderates (10.9%, p < 0.001) and conservatives (13.7%, p <
0.001) relative to liberals; and those making $25,000–$49,999 (5.1% p = 0.023),
$50,000–$74,999 (5.4%, p = 0.024), and $75,000 in annual income (6.7%, p =
0.007) relative to those reporting less than $25,000.
30
Black mock jurors were significantly less likely to pass the death qualification than White mock jurors (-7.3%, p = 0.018), as were religious mock jurors
relative to non-religious mock jurors (-7.6%, p < 0.001).
31
Males were significantly less likely to pass the death qualification than females (-5.1%, p = 0.001), but were more likely to recommend a death sentence
(5.4%, p = 0.008) as were mock jurors in the 35–44 age group (10.8%, p = 0.007),
the 45–54 age group (11.4%, p = 0.008), and the older than 55 age group (12.1%,
p = 0.006) relative to the 18–24 age group.
29
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death-qualified venire but were also significantly more likely to recommend a death sentence. 32
My statistical results did not show evidence of race-of-defendant
bias or race-of-victim bias in the full death-qualified venire. 33 In
contrast to previous research, I also found no evidence that darkening the Black defendant’s complexion and eye color led to more punitive sentencing recommendations. 34 However, my results do provide compelling evidence of race-of-defendant bias among the
10.1% of death-qualified mock jurors who failed the voir dire questions inquiring into racial bias. These mock jurors were 18.3% to
18.4% more likely to sentence a Black defendant to death than a
White defendant ceteris paribus. 35 Monte Carlo simulations revealed that the death qualification increased the likelihood of empaneling at least one of these racially biased jurors on a petite jury
by 8.4%.
In Part I of this study, I define race, examine how racism infiltrated American culture, explore how legal institutions reinforced
and formalized racist social norms, and discuss the effects of de jure
and de facto discrimination on the evolution of capital punishment
in the United States. I review empirical research on juror decisionmaking in Part II, outline my methodology in Part III, and report my
empirical results in Part IV. Accepting the results of this study as
true and generalizable to jury-eligible adults arguendo, in Part V, I
32
Mock jurors who failed voir dire were more likely to sentence a defendant
to death relative to those who passed (13.9%, p < 0.001) as were moderates
(11.7%, p < 0.001) and conservatives (25.6%, p < 0.001) relative to liberals.
33
See generally Levinson et al., supra note 26, at 521 (discussing finding that
measures of racial bias predicted race-of-defendant and race-of victim-effects, but
finding no overall effect).
34
See generally Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17
PSYCH. SCI. 383, 385 (2006) (reporting that defendants perceived as more stereotypically Black were significantly more likely to receive a death sentence when
their victim was white). See infra Table D-2 of Appendix D. The simple effects
calculated showed no significant differences between the Black defendant treatments (Black (Dark) – Black (Light)) when the victim’s race was ambiguous
(2.7%, p = 0.504), White (-3.1%, p = 0.459), or Black (Black: -1.8%, p = 0.666).
35
See infra Table 7. Mock jurors who failed voir dire were significantly more
likely to sentence both the Black defendant of lighter complexion (Black (Light):
18.3%, p = 0.012) and darker complexion (Black (Dark): 18.4%, p = 0.012) to
death than the White defendant.
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argue that the death qualification violates an African American’s
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury by increasing the probability of empaneling partial jurors who make racially biased sentencing decisions. I also argue that any legitimate state interest in
removing nullifiers in capital trials is countervailed by evidence that
the same process increases the likelihood of empaneling racist jurors. Continuing to death qualify juries in capital trials of African
American defendants is especially troubling because the death qualification not only appears to overrepresent racist jurors, it appears to
simultaneously underrepresent African American’s on death qualified venires. Striking prospective African American jurors based on
an ideological belief tied to their racial identity, like opposition to
the death penalty, is synonymous with striking Black jurors because
of their racial identity and should be critically reevaluated. 36
Many scholars believe that modern racism is largely unconscious and screening for racial bias during voir dire would be “minimally useful,” “patronizing,” and unlikely to elicit truthful responses. 37 The fact that 10.1% of the mock jurors who participated
in this study openly admitted to racial bias suggests otherwise. However, it is important to remember that voir dire is a safeguard, not a
panacea, voir screening methods are highly idiosyncratic, and current voir dire practices encourage dishonesty. 38 I conclude this article by arguing that voir dire inquiry into racial bias should be an
absolute right in capital trials. Finally, I advocate for increased use
of questionnaires in voir dire, providing jury instructions on explicit
and implicit bias, closer scrutiny of prospective jurors who self-report biases, ending the practice of rehabilitating jurors who give assurances they can be impartial after admitting to bias, and striking
jurors when racial bias can reasonably be implied.

See Levinson et al., supra note 26, at 568.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156,
160–62 (1989) (describing voir dire inquiry into racial bias as “patronizing” and
“‘minimally useful’”); Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias,
5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843, 846 (2015) (discussing Albert Alschuler’s criticisms
of voir dire); Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New
Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 193–245 (2018) (discussing studies of implicit
bias).
38
Alschuler, supra note 37, at 154.
36
37
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I. RACE, RACISM, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN PERSPECTIVE
Racist ideologies began to coalesce in their modern form in
many parts of the world, including the Americas, in the sixteenth
through eighteenth centuries. 39 Prior to the publication of the Origin
of Species in 1859, scientists viewed the world through a Linnaean
lens and grouped living beings, including people, into taxonomies
based on phenotypic characteristics, behavioral traits, and geographic dispersal. 40 Scientists believed these traits were the immutable product of divine creation and were passed from generation to
generation unchanged. 41
As European colonialists encountered new populations, they defined racial groups, ranking them based on their alleged proximity
to God with those of European descent at the top and those of African descent at the bottom. 42 Colonial powers used religion and pseudoscience, particularly the supposed immutability of physical and
behavioral characteristics, to justify racial hierarchies, separation of
the races, social and legal enforcement of racist norms, subjugation,
slavery, and genocide. 43 Even with the emergence of Darwinism and
broad acceptance of evolutionary theory, scientists rebranded racial
classification systems as the product of a dynamic process of natural
selection, rather than divine creation, and justified racial hierarchies
by classifying Europeans as “more evolved” than non-European
populations. 44 In the absence of scientific evidence of a European
epicenter of human origins, it was famously fabricated to fit a racist,
Eurocentric narrative. 45

Smedley & Smedley, supra note 2, at 19.
George J. Armelagos & Alan H. Goodman, Race, Racism, and Anthropology, in BUILDING A NEW BIOCULTURAL SYNTHESIS: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN BIOLOGY 359, 360–61 (Alan H. Goodman & Thomas
L. Leatherman eds., 1998).
41
Id. at 360–61.
42
Id.
43
Smedley & Smedley, supra note 2, at 19.
44
Armelagos & Goodman, supra note 40, at 361.
45
See generally Sheela Athreya & Rebecca Rogers Ackermann, Colonialism
and Narratives of Human Origins in Asia and Africa, in INTERROGATING HUMAN
ORIGINS: DECOLONISATION AND THE DEEP PAST 72, 74–76 (Martin Porr &
Jacqueline Matthews eds., 2019) (discussing the Piltdown Hoax and scientific efforts to promote Europe as the “epicenter of human origins”).
39
40
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A.
Race and Racism in Historical and Cultural Context
Race is a pseudoscientific construct. 46 Modern humans share
99.9% percent of DNA in common with small variations between
populations. 47 Phenotypic differences in hair and skin color, which
provide the arbitrary bases of racial classifications, are adaptations
moderated by a small number of atypical genes that vary geographically in the frequency of their distribution. 48 Humans evolved too
recently and populations lived in geographic isolation too briefly for
enough genetic divergence to occur to biologically justify racial taxonomies. 49
Race is socially, not biologically, defined. 50 Someone considered “Black” in American society may find he or she is perceived
differently in Chadian society, for example. 51 The U.S. Census Bureau has also consistently changed race and ethnicity questions to
conform to evolving social norms. 52 Although race has failed to explain biological and human variation in a scientifically meaningful
way, it has provided a powerful means of devaluing human beings
and maintaining existing power structures. 53 Racism has had a powerful influence on American socio-legal institutions historically and
continues to affect crime and punishment in the United States today. 54

Smedley & Smedley, supra note 2, at 16–26.
Francis S. Collins & Monique K. Mansoura, The Human Genome Project:
Revealing the Shared Inheritance of all Humankind, 91 CANCER 221, 222 (2001).
48
Id.; Marcus W. Feldman et al., Race: A Genetic Melting-Pot, 424 NATURE
374, 374 (2003).
49
Collins & Mansoura, supra note 47, at 222.
50
See Smedley & Smedley, supra note 2, at 16.
51
Alexander Hurst, ‘I Felt Like an Impostor’: A Mixed-Race American in
Africa, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2018, 1:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
news/2018/dec/14/i-felt-like-an-impostor-a-mixed-race-american-in-africa.
52
Kay Deaux, Ethnic/Racial Identity: Fuzzy Categories and Shifting Positions, 677 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 39–43 (2018).
53
See Armelagos & Goodman, supra note 40, at 359.
54
See generally Zinzi D. Bailey et al., How Structural Racism Works — Racist Policies as a Root Cause of U.S. Racial Health Inequities, 384 NEW ENGL. J.
MED. 768, 768–771 (2021).
46
47
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B.
Legally Defining Blackness and Whiteness
As Europeans brought slaves to the American Colonies, they enforced a racial hierarchy through bondage and violence. 55 As early
as the seventeenth century, lawmakers began to legally define
Whiteness and Blackness to reflect social biases. 56 In many jurisdictions, Blacks faced mandatory death sentences for murder, rape, and
several other enumerated crimes that did not carry the same sentences for Whites. 57 Capital punishment and extrajudicial murder
often involved torture, dismemberment, mutilation, and public display of the dead as a warning to others. 58 In the seventeen and eighteenth centuries, brutal forms of execution—typically reserved for
slaves—included “beheading, pressing to death, drawing and quartering, breaking on the wheel, drowning, and burning at the stake.” 59
Beginning in the seventeenth century, colonial lawmakers
passed strict anti-miscegenation laws to maintain racial separation. 60
Despite these laws, there was significant geneflow between people
of African and European descent, and the arbitrary distinctions between White and Black began to blur. 61 Definitions of Blackness
ranged from “one-drop” rules that classified anyone with “Negro
blood” as “Negro” to more subjective “appreciable admixture” rules
and one-eighth rules that relied on the races of an individual’s grandparents. 62 The geographic and temporal variability of these categorizations underscores their arbitrary nature. 63

55
LÓPEZ, supra note 5, at 81–86; see generally Kevin Mumford, After Hugh:
Statutory Race Segregation in Colonial America, 1630-1725, 43 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 280, 280–305 (1999).
56
LÓPEZ, supra note 5, at 81–86; Mumford, supra note 55, at 295.
57
STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 6, at 20–21.
58
Id. at 17–19, 25.
59
Id.; ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 189 (5th ed.
2017).
60
See generally Mumford, supra note 55, at 280–305.
61
See generally Esteban J. Parra et al., Estimating African American Admixture Proportions by Use of Population-Specific Alleles, 63 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
1839, 1839–51 (1998); Sarah A. Tishkoff et al., The Genetic Structure and History of Africans and African Americans, 324 SCIENCE 1035, 1035–44 (2009).
62
LÓPEZ, supra note 5, at 82–83.
63
Id. at 83 (describing how these “boundaries of Black identity” differed
from state to state, i.e. Alabama and Arkansas using the “one-drop” rule compared
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Frustrated by the lack of any scientifically meaningful and consistent method of classifying racial groups, lawmakers and jurists
struggled to establish legal rules to define Whiteness. 64 For example, from 1790 to 1952, naturalization was restricted to “free white
persons,” which forced courts to define who qualified as White. 65 In
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, the Supreme Court rejected
“scientific” racial classification methods and opted for a commonsense approach holding that “the words ‘free white persons’ are
words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the
understanding of the common man . . . .” 66 The Thind Court emphasized that “[i]t does not seem necessary to pursue the matter of scientific classification further” and limited Whiteness to those of European descent, as the Court believed the drafters of the naturalization law had envisioned. 67 Discriminatory laws, 68 one-drop rules, 69
and racist judicial decisions 70 provide a lens into a society struggling
to maintain a pseudoscientific racial hierarchy—a racial hierarchy
that carried very real consequences.
C.

Mob Violence and Racial Injustice in the Jim Crow South
Following the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments between 1865 and 1870, subjugation through
slavery ended, and de jure “Jim Crow” segregation began. 71 Jim
Crow laws codified de facto racial segregation into law beginning
in the 1880s and 1890s and gained approval from the Supreme Court
in Plessy v. Ferguson with the “separate but equal doctrine” in
1896. 72 Widespread racial violence against African Americans was
to Tennessee actually defining “Blacks” as ‘mulattoes, mestizos, and their descendants . . . .”).
64
Id. at 92, 103.
65
See id. at 1, 88; see U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214 (1923).
66
Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. at 214.
67
Id. at 204, 207 (“Section 2619, Revised Statutes . . . provides that the provisions of the Naturalization Act shall apply to aliens, being free white persons,
and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”) (citations
omitted).
68
See Mumford, supra note 55, at 295.
69
See LÓPEZ, supra note 5, at 82-83.
70
See Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. at 213.
71
LESLIE VINCENT TISCHAUSER, JIM CROW LAWS 1–16 (2012).
72
Id. at 1–32.
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commonplace in the Jim Crow South. 73 Whites feared property
crimes, violence, and “sexual aggression” from newly freed slave
populations. 74 At least 4,425 lynchings were documented between
1877 and 1950, which often involved burning, mutilation, and dismemberment. 75
Widespread mob violence in the South led many to question
whether southern states could maintain the supremacy of legal authority. 76 White mobs terrorized Black communities in dozens of
cities in the early twentieth century culminating in the Red Summer
of 1919. 77 Many of these violent outbursts of racial hatred, which
are often omitted from history books, followed a similar pattern: a
White mob would form, demand to lynch a Black man accused of
an interracial crime, and then riot—indiscriminately killing African
Americans and burning Black homes and businesses with few, if
any, repercussions. 78 In the first half of the twentieth century, the
threat of racial violence overshadowed numerous trials in the South
and deprived many African American defendants of basic due process. 79 Moore v. Dempsey, Powell v. Alabama, and Brown v. Mississippi show the close nexus between state sanctioned capital punishment and lynching. 80
The events that led to Moore began in 1919 when a number of
White farmers and law enforcement officers purportedly shot into a
union meeting of Black sharecroppers in Phillips County, Arkansas,
before the sharecroppers returned fire, killing a White man. 81 Days
73
NGOZI NDULUE, ENDURING INJUSTICE: THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE U.S. DEATH PENALTY 5–10 (Robert Dunham ed., 2020).
74
STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 6, at 22.
75
Id. at 25; NDULUE, supra note 73, at 6.
76
See generally Elwood M. Beck et al., Contested Terrain: The State Versus
Threatened Lynch Mob Violence, 121 AM. J. SOCIO. 1856, 1856–1884 (2016).
77
See generally JAN VOOGD, RACE RIOTS & RESISTANCE: THE RED SUMMER
OF 1919 ix–118 (2008).
78
Id. at 18; LES PAYNE & TAMARA PAYNE, THE DEAD ARE ARISING: THE
LIFE OF MALCOLM X 13–23 (2020).
79
See NDULUE, supra note 73, at 5–8.
80
See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 47–48 (1932); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936); see generally STEWART EMORY TOLNAY & ELWOOD M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF
VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930 1–16 (1995)
(discussing the legacy of racial violence in the South).
81
Moore, 261 U.S. at 87.
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of mob violence followed, and scores of African Americans were
killed. 82 In the mayhem, a second White man was allegedly shot and
killed, and numerous African Americans were arrested, including
the five petitioners in Moore. 83 After the arrests, a mob marched on
the jail, and demanded to lynch the defendants before it was disbursed by law enforcement with assurances that “the law” would be
carried out, presumably meaning the defendants would be executed. 84
As the sharecroppers’ trial neared, witnesses were beaten until
they gave evidence, and a mob surrounded the courthouse threatening anyone “interfering with the desired result.” 85 The defendants
were convicted after an abbreviated trial of less than an hour. 86 Defense counsel did not consult with their clients, make any legal challenges, or call any witnesses, and after deliberating for less than five
minutes, an all-white jury returned guilty verdicts. 87 Following a habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners’
rights to due process had been violated, opining that “[a] trial for
murder in a state court in which the accused are hurried to conviction
under mob domination without regard for their rights, is without due
process of law and absolutely void.” 88
The petitioners in Powell were Black teenagers accused of raping two White women on a freight train in northern Alabama in
1931. 89 The young men, who became known as the Scottsboro Boys,
were held under close military guard through every stage of their
detainment and trials, owing to a tense atmosphere of mob hostility. 90 The defendants were not given time to secure counsel and were
not provided with counsel until the day of trial, when they were represented by a lawyer who admitted the defendants “would be better
off if he should step entirely out of the case” and a second equally

82
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure,
99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 50–51 (2000).
83
See id. at 51; Moore, 261 U.S. at 87–88.
84
Moore, 261 U.S. at 88–89.
85
Id. at 89.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 86.
89
Klarman, supra note 82, at 51.
90
Id.; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51 (1932).
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ill-equipped member of the bar. 91 The defendants, who were rushed
to trial, received nothing more than a “pro forma” defense, and were
sentenced to death in a series of trials that were completed in a day. 92
When the defendants’ appeals reached the Supreme Court, the Powell Court held that the teenagers’ rights under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated, noting:
a defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not
be stripped of his right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense. To do that
is not to proceed promptly in the calm spirit of regulated justice but to go forward with the haste of the
mob. 93
A few years later in 1934, the events unfolded that would lead
to the Brown decision. 94 Three African American men were accused
of murdering a White farmer in Kemper County, Mississippi.95 The
men were intimidated, beaten, and tortured by a mob, including law
enforcement officers, until they confessed to stories dictated to
them. 96 After an abrupt trial, the men were convicted and sentenced
to death based on the coerced confessions alone. 97 A habeas corpus
petition made its way to the Supreme Court, and the Brown Court
held that confessions extracted through the use of force violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, emphasizing
that “[t]he rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the
witness stand.” 98 Together Moore, Powell, and Brown provide a
glimpse of grave injustices, an ominous shadow of mob violence,
and a flagrant disregard for the constitutional rights of African
Americans in the Jim Crow South.

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Klarman, supra note 82, at 55; Powell, 287 U.S. at 51–58.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added).
Id. at 59.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936).
Id. at 279.
Id. at 281–283.
Id. at 284.
Id. 285–286.
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D.

Reforming the Death Penalty During the Civil Rights Era
The Civil Rights Movement was instrumental in reforming the
death penalty due in large part to the steadfast work of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”)
and the Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”). 99 Until the 1970s, juries had
standardless discretion to impose the death penalty, and when they
did, racial discrepancies in sentencing rates were extremely conspicuous. 100 For example, between 1930 and 1967, 455 inmates were
executed for rape, and 405, or 89%, were Black. 101 The LDF relied
on empirical evidence to support several death penalty appeals. 102
To show statewide discrimination in Arkansas in Maxwell v. Bishop,
LDF attorneys introduced statistical evidence that Black defendants
were significantly more likely to receive a death sentence when
charged with raping a White woman than any other defendant-victim combination.103 The Eight Circuit rejected this evidence concluding that it did not show discrimination in the case at hand. 104 In
the years that followed the Maxwell decision, many courts have echoed this mantra to avoid addressing glaring social inequalities. 105
After focusing primarily on capital cases involving Black defendants charged with nonhomicidal crimes, the LDF began representing every death row inmate it could, regardless of race, and
brought as many procedural challenges possible in an attempt to impose a de facto moratorium on the death penalty. 106 The work of the
LDF led to a slew of Supreme Court cases, and notably to McGautha
v. California, where the Court held that unitary proceedings that
See generally, Eric L. Muller, The Legal Defense Fund’s Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 158,
158–187 (1985) (discussing the history of the LDF).
100
STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 6, at 43–44.
101
Id. at 44.
102
Muller, supra note 99, at 164–166.
103
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 143 (8th Cir 1968); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race, U.
CHI. L. REV. 243, 256 (2015).
104
Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 147.
105
Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial
Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 509–
527 (1994).
106
Muller, supra note 99, at 164–170 (“LDF attorneys sought postponements
for all rape cases on appeal . . . us[ing] statistics to bolster their demands for outright abolition of the death penalty for rape . . . .”).
99
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assessed guilt and sentencing simultaneously, and the standardless
discretion juries had to impose the death penalty, did not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 107 Although
McGautha appeared to be the death knell of the moratorium movement, in 1972, the Supreme Court reversed course in Furman v.
Georgia. 108
In Furman, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion followed by nine separate opinions, with the majority holding that the
death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.109
Although it is difficult to distill a 50,000 word opinion, and only
Justices Marshall and Brennan believed the death penalty was per
se unconstitutional, the five Justices in the majority were primarily
concerned with arbitrary death sentencing patterns that appeared divorced from crime characteristics, the unfettered discretion of
judges and juries to impose capital sentences, discrepancies in sentencing across racial and social groups, and the excessive and abhorrent nature of the punishment. 110 It followed from Furman, by
implication, that all capital sentencing statutes nationwide were unconstitutional. 111
In the wake of Furman, 558 death sentences were commuted to
life in prison in jurisdictions across the country. 112 In the two years
after the decision, over thirty states amended their death penalty statutes. 113 Many of these statutes narrowed the number of capital
crimes, bifurcated the guilt and sentencing phases of trials, allowed
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 221–222 (1971).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
109
Id.; Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (1970).
110
James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders,
23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 5, 5 (1989); Sherod Thaxton, Un-Gregg-Ulated: Capital
Charging and the Missing Mandate of Gregg v. Georgia, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 145, 149–152 (2016); Polsby, supra note 109, at 11–15.
111
Thaxton, supra note 110, at 149 (“According to the Court, all existing capital punishment statutes—both state and federal—were unconstitutional as applied . . . .”); Polsby, supra note 109, at 1 (“By implication, most or all extant
statutes in American jurisdictions that prescribe the death penalty are unconstitutional.”).
112
Thaxton, supra note 110, at 149; Marquart & Sorensen, supra note 110, at
7.
113
Baldus et al., supra note 12, at 1649.
107
108
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defendants to enter mitigating evidence in a pre-sentencing hearing,
mandated jury instructions, implemented weighing procedures requiring capital juries to balance aggravating and mitigating factors,
and provided for mandatory review of every death sentence by the
jurisdiction’s highest court. 114
E.
The Modern Era of the Death Penalty
In 1974, Leon Gregg received four death sentences under new
Georgia statutes passed in the wake of Furman. 115 His appeals challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty in Georgia reached
the Supreme Court in 1976 and were consolidated with similar appeals from four other states. 116 In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court concluded that the new death penalty statutes in Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas were constitutional, and “[t]he new procedures on
their face satisf[ied] the concerns of Furman.” 117 Although the
Gregg Court concluded that post-Furman reforms were adequate,
empirical research in the years that followed provides evidence that
the death penalty continued to be imposed disproportionately to
punish African Americans, particularly African Americans accused
of killing White victims. 118
In 1987, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court directly addressed the question of whether statistical evidence showing that a
Black defendant was more likely to receive a death sentence if he
killed a White victim violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 119 The statistical studies at the heart of McCleskey, which
were conducted by Baldus and colleagues and funded by the LDF,
analyzed 2,484 homicide cases in Georgia between 1973 and 1978,
controlling for numerous covariates. 120 The Baldus study found that
Thaxton, supra note 110, at 153.
Id. at 154.
116
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 153 (1976).
117
Id. at 155.
118
Baldus et al., supra note 12, at 1731.
119
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 279 (1987).
120
See David Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661,
661–753 (1983); David C. Baldus et al., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1375, 1375–1407 (1985); Samuel R. Gross, David Baldus and the Legacy of
McCleskey V. Kemp, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1905, 1917 (2012).
114
115
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21% of Black defendants and 8% of White defendants received a
death sentence for killing a White victim. 121 In comparison, 1% of
Black defendants and 3% of White defendants received a death sentence for killing a Black victim. 122 The authors calculated that the
odds that a defendant would receive a death sentence were 4.3 times
higher if the victim killed was White. 123
The McCleskey Court dismissed the statistical findings of the
Baldus study in similar fashion to the Eighth Circuit in Maxwell,
opining “[t]he statistics do not prove that race enters into any capital
sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in petitioner’s case.”124
The McCleskey Court also noted that statistical evidence was better
directed at legislatures and deemed that existing judicial safeguards
were sufficient to protect against discrimination. 125 Although not reflected in the McCleskey Court’s decision, Baldus and colleagues
questioned whether the fact that their statistical findings showed
race-of-victim bias, a factor under a murderer’s control, rather than
race-of-defendant bias, undermined McCleskey’s “moral” claim.126
Regardless, the decisions in Gregg and McCleskey largely extinguished the hope generated by Furman. 127
F.
A New Era of Segregation
In addition to addressing social injustice in capital trials, the
Civil Rights movement was hugely influential in addressing de jure
racial segregation in American society. 128 By the latter half of the
twentieth century, de jure segregation was on the decline, and a new
era of de facto segregation of urban and suburban space took hold. 129
Over four million African Americans left the South between 1940
and 1970, and by 1980, 73% of metropolitan Blacks lived in inner
cities compared to 33% of metropolitan Whites. 130 For every
Baldus et al., supra note 12, at 1731.
Id.
123
Id.
124
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 282.
125
Id. at 313, 319.
126
Baldus et al., supra note 12, at 1733.
127
See Gross, supra note 120, at 1921–22.
128
Goldberg, supra note 7, at 16–17.
129
Leah Platt Boustan, Was Postwar Suburbanization “White Flight”? Evidence from the Black Migration, 125 Q. J. ECON. 417, 418–419 (2010).
130
Id. at 417–18.
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African American that settled in a city, an estimated 2.7 Whites
moved to the suburbs. 131 These demographic shifts coincided with
industrial decline and concentrated African Americans in disadvantaged inner-city areas with high poverty, high unemployment, poor
schools, poor social services, and little investment. 132 Many predominantly Black cities in the South faced similar issues. 133
Empirical research shows that crime rates are typically higher in
extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods, and local structural disadvantages account for White-Black differences in crime. 134 Higher
rates of segregation in urban areas are associated with higher levels
of violent crime, regardless of neighborhood racial composition.135
Empirical evidence also shows higher rates of violence in places
with fewer manufacturing jobs. 136 As manufacturing moved overseas, economic segregation intensified and led to higher rates of
poverty in Black communities, a factor which typically leads to
higher crime. 137 These problems were compounded by the War on
Drugs, heavy-handed policing, and an emphasis on punitiveness
across the political spectrum that led to mass incarceration, particularly of minorities. 138 More recent research shows that, although violence and property crime decreased from 2010 to 2013 in most areas, the decline was more modest in African American communities. 139 This research suggests that the Black-White crime gap is
widening, and racially disproportionate trends in arrests and convictions are likely to continue. 140

Id. at 419.
Goldberg, supra note 7, at 18.
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Id. at 19.
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Krivo et al., supra note 19, at 352.
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Lauren J. Krivo et al., Segregation, Racial Structure, and Neighborhood
Violent Crime, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1765, 1789 (2009).
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Id. at 1785, 1793.
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See Krivo et al., supra note 19, at 350–53; Krivo et al., supra note 135, at
1768–71; Goldberg, supra note 7, at 18–19.
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Id. at 351–53, 365; Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 7, 8–18 (2011).
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II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JUROR DECISION-MAKING
Meta-analyses of empirical studies of juror decision-making
provide strong evidence of race-of-victim bias but only modest evidence of race-of-defendant bias with high between-study heterogeneity, indicating that race-of-defendant bias is likely moderated by
other variables. 141 Although early mock juror research suggests that
race-of-defendant guilt and sentencing bias is moderated by explicit
racial bias, 142 few researchers have reexamined these relationships. 143
A.
Studies of Race-of-Victim Bias
In 1990, given concerns over racial disparities in death-sentencing patterns in the wake of Furman, the United States General Accounting Office (“GAO”) conducted a review of capital charging,
sentencing, and conviction rates. 144 The GAO considered 28 postFurman studies of 23 datasets, 82% of the studies reported that a
victim’s race influenced the likelihood that a defendant would be
capitally charged or receive a death sentence—defendants accused
of murdering Whites were more likely to receive a death sentence
than those accused of killing Blacks. 145 However, the impact of a
defendant’s race on sentencing outcomes, irrespective of a victim’s
race, was less clear and varied across studies. 146 In 1998, Baldus and
George Woodworth expanded the GOA report and found evidence
of race-of-victim disparities favoring White victims in twenty-five
of thirty jurisdictions, and evidence of race-of-defendant disparities
favoring White defendants in thirty jurisdictions.147
See infra Sections II.A–B.
See John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and
Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 510, 524 (1997) [hereinafter Nature of Prejudice].
143
See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
144
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 1–5 (1990).
145
Id. at 3–5.
146
Id. at 6.
147
David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the
Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT
WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 501, 519 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed.
2003).
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In 2006, Jennifer Eberhardt and colleagues added an important
dimension to death penalty research on race-of-victim bias. 148 The
authors analyzed forty-four capital trials from Philadelphia between
1977 and 1999 with Black defendants and White victims. 149 The authors had undergraduate students rate images of the defendants
based on how stereotypically Black they looked. 150 The results
showed that 24.4% of the defendants who were considered less stereotypically Black received a death sentence, compared to 57.5% of
defendants who were deemed more stereotypically Black. 151 The
authors also evaluated a subset of 118 trials where both the defendant and victim were Black. 152 The death sentencing rate was 46.6%
for defendants considered less stereotypically Black and 45% for
defendants considered more stereotypically Black, a difference that
was not statistically significant. 153 These results supported the authors’ conclusion that jurors were more biased against defendants
who looked more stereotypically Black, but only if the victim was
White. 154
More recently, in 2015, Frank R. Baumgartner and colleagues
evaluated thirty capital-prosecution studies from 1976 to 2007 and
found that, in every study, killers of Whites were more likely than
killers of Blacks to be capitally prosecuted. 155 The authors also
found that of the seventy-eight post-Furman capital-sentencing
studies they considered, sixty-nine studies reported evidence of
race-of-victim bias. 156 The average bias ratio was 2.85 in prosecution studies and 6.93 in sentencing studies. 157 Ratios of 1.00 would
indicate that defendants were equally likely to be capitally prosecuted and sentenced, respectively, regardless of whether the victim
was White or Black. 158 The fact that both ratios were higher than
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150
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Eberhardt et al., supra note 34, at 383.
Id. at 383–84.
Id. at 384.
Id. (reporting a statistically significant F-statistic (F = 4.11, p < 0.05)).
Id. at 384–85.
Id. at 385 (reporting an F-statistic of F < 1).
See id.
Baumgartner et al., supra note 24, at 211–12, 219 n.6.
Id. at 212.
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Id. at 211–212.
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1.00 indicates that killers of Whites were more likely to be capitally
prosecuted and sentenced than killers of Blacks. 159
Baumgartner and colleagues also studied all the executions reported in the United States between 1977 and 2013 and collected
information on the associated victims. 160 The results showed that the
ratio of executions relative to homicides by race of offender and victim was 3.83 for the Black defendant/White victim group, 1.02 for
the White Defendant/White victim group, 0.46 for Black defendant/Black victim group, and 0.34 for the White defendant/Black victim group. 161 These results indicate that Black defendants were over
eleven times more likely to be executed for killing a White victim
than a Black victim.
B.
Studies of Race-of-Defendant Bias
In 1992, Craig Haney and Laura T. Sweeney conducted a metaanalysis of fourteen experimental studies that included nineteen statistical tests of race-of-defendant sentencing bias. 162 One of the studies examined capital sentencing, while the other thirteen considered
non-capital cases. 163 The results indicated that mock jurors were significantly more punitive towards Black defendants than White defendants, but the effect size was small. 164 The authors also examined
potential sources of between-study heterogeneity. 165 The results indicated that studies that included more methodological rigor, illustrated the defendant pictorially, and considered the race of mock jurors, the defendant, and the victim uncovered race-of-defendant bias
more consistently. 166
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Id. at 215–216.
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Id. at 216–17.
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Sweeney & Haney, supra note 27, at 183–85.
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Id. at 184.
164
Id. at 189, 190 (reporting a significant p-value (p < 0.001) and noting that
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See id. at 186–88.
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Two years later, Ronald Mazzella and Alan Feingold conducted
a meta-analysis of research on mock juror decision-making, which
included an examination of twenty-nine studies that considered both
defendant and victim race. 167 The authors found no evidence of raceof-defendant bias in either the full sample of studies that evaluated
verdicts or the studies that independently considered murder, assault, rape, and negligent homicide. 168 The authors also did not find
evidence of race-of-defendant bias in sentencing in the full sample
or when studies of theft, assault, and rape were considered independently. 169 However, there was evidence that mock jurors were
more punitive in sentencing towards Black defendants in negligent
homicide studies and towards White defendants in studies of
fraud. 170 The authors concluded that high levels of heterogeneity between studies suggested that differences in methodological approaches, statistical measures, and a complex interaction of variables impacted the results. 171
After more than a decade of additional research, a consensus still
had not emerged regarding race-of-defendant bias. 172 In 2005, Tara
L. Mitchell and colleagues hypothesized that mock jurors would
show more race-of-defendant out-group bias against defendants of
a different race. 173 The authors found a statistically significant but
small effect size, indicating very slight race-of-defendant out-group
bias in mock juror verdicts. 174 Similarly to previous meta-analyses,
Mazzella & Feingold, supra note 27, at 1319, 1325, 1330, 1332–34.
Id. at 1325, 1330, 1333 (reporting a Cohen’s d very close to zero for the
full sample of studies (d = 0.01, k = 21, n = 3486)).
169
Id. (reporting a small Cohen’s d of for the full sample (d = 0.06, k = 27, N
= 4045)).
170
Id. at 1332–33 (reporting a modest Cohen’s d for non-negligent homicide
(d = 0.22, k = 5, n = 506) and for fraud (d = -0.37, k = 4, n = 231), and concluding
“there was consistent evidence of heterogeneity of race effects on guilt attributions”).
171
Id. at 1325, 1330, 1333–35 (reporting chi-square tests of homogeneity of
effect sizes with p-values of p < 0.001 for studies of race-of-victim and race-ofdefendant bias in guilt and sentencing decisions).
172
See Mitchell et al., supra note 27, at 621–24 (reviewing the literature on
racial bias and jury decision-making and noting inconsistencies among the thencurrent state of the field).
173
Id. at 627.
174
Id. (reporting a statistically significant Z-statistic (Z = 3.93, p < 0.001) and
a modest Cohen’s d (d = 0.09, k = 46, n = 7,397)).
167
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the authors noted high between-study heterogeneity. 175 When the
authors considered punitiveness in sentencing, they found a slightly
larger, but still small, effect reflective of slight race-of-defendant
out-group sentencing bias. 176 Once again, there was large betweenstudy heterogeneity. 177
More recently, in 2014, Devine and Caughlin meta-analyzed the
effects of mock juror attributes on guilt judgments. 178 The greatest
effects, albeit still modest, were associated with authoritarianism
and trust in the legal system. 179 The authors found limited evidence
that Black jurors showed stronger out-group bias than White jurors. 180 Given high levels of heterogeneity, Devine and Caughlin
conducted moderator analyses. 181 Effect sizes were once again
small, but the authors found that mock jurors with higher authoritarianism scores were significantly more likely to convict in homicide
cases and in capital trials than mock jurors with lower authoritarianism scores, and men were more likely to convict or recommend
death in capital trials than women. 182

Id. (reporting a significant Cochran’s Q (Q = 279.28, p < 0.001)).
Id. at 628 (reporting a significant Z-statistic (Z = 5.10, p < 0.001) and a
small Cohen’s d (d = 0.19, k = 20, N = 3,141)).
177
Id. at 627-629.
178
Devine & Caughlin, supra note 27, at 109–10 (discussing authoritarianism
and trust in the legal system).
179
Id. at 115 (reporting statistically significant but small mean-weighted Pearson’s correlation coefficients for juror authoritarianism (r̅ = 0.17, k = 11, N =
2,938, p < 0.01) and for trust in the legal system (r̅ = 0.22, k = 17, N = 2,763, p <
0.01)). For reference, sample mean-weighted Pearson correlations (𝑟𝑟̅) of 0.00 to
0.30 are generally considered small. See also SPSS TUTORIALS: PEARSON
CORRELATION, KENT ST. UNIV. LIBR., https://libguides.library.kent.edu/SPSS/
PearsonCorr (last visited Nov. 3, 2021).
180
Id. (reporting a non-significant mean-weighted Pearson’s correlation coefficient (𝑟𝑟̅ = 0.13, k = 10, N = 1,029, p > 0.05) for White mock jurors and a significant mean-weighted Pearson’s correlation coefficient (𝑟𝑟̅ = -0.02, k = 32, N =
4,476, p < 0.05) for Black mock jurors).
181
Id. at 118.
182
Id. at 119 (reporting statistically significant (p < 0.01) mean-weighted
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for juror authoritarianism in homicide cases (𝑟𝑟̅ =
0.20, k = 13, N = 2,528, p < 0.01), capital trials (𝑟𝑟̅ = 0.21, k = 8, N = 1,930, p <
0.01), and for men in capital trials (𝑟𝑟̅ = -0.07, k = 9, N = 3,621, p < 0.05)).
175
176
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C.
Studies of Explicit and Implicit Bias
Many people who hold explicitly racist views are aware that racial stereotypes affect their decision-making and act in unabashedly
racist and intentionally discriminatory ways. 183 This first form of
overt bias is known as explicit bias. 184 Many other people claim, and
even believe, that they hold egalitarian views and are unaware that
racial stereotypes subtly affect their thoughts and actions. 185 This
second form of bias is known as implicit bias. 186 Explicit bias is typically studied by social scientists using survey methods, while implicit bias is typically studied with implicit association tests
(“IATs”). 187 Although racism operates on multiple levels of consciousness in complex ways, many scholars prefer to temporarily
dichotomize racism as explicit and old-fashioned or implicit and
modern. 188 This dichotomization has led many scholars to dismiss
explicit racism as a relic of the past and focus their attention primarily, if not exclusively, on implicit bias.189 As a result, studies of implicit bias have proliferated, yielding important insights and
183
John F. Dovidio et al., Reducing Contemporary Prejudice: Combating Explicit and Implicit Bias at the Individual and Intergroup Level, in REDUCING
PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 137, 137 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) [hereinafter
Reducing Contemporary Prejudice].
184
Selmi, supra note 37, at 198.
185
Reducing Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 183, at 137–38.
186
Selmi, supra note 37, at 194.
187
Id. at 198–99. IATs measure the differential association of concepts. For
example, study participants may be asked to press a key on a computer keyboard
when they see a word or concept in one of two categories. When the concepts
mapped onto the same key are associated, responses are typically faster. If study
participants are asked to press one button when they see a female face or name
and a second button when they see a male face or name, they are likely to respond
faster than if they were asked to press one button when they see a female face and
a male name and a second button when they see a male face and a female name.
See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
1464, 1464–80 (1998). Researchers have adapted this methodology to study unconscious racial bias in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al.,
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 876, 876–93 (2004) (showing that White study participants subliminally
primed with an image of an African American face recognized images of weapons
more quickly than participants subliminally primed with a White face).
188
Selmi, supra note 37, at 198.
189
See id. at 198–99.
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inspiring numerous acolytes, but often at the expense of a more holistic approach. 190
While dozens of researchers have studied race-of-victim and
race-of-defendant bias over the past few decades, surprisingly few
have considered the effects of implicit bias on juror decision-making—fewer still have examined the effects of explicit bias. 191 Two
seminal studies led by John F. Dovidio provide insight into the impact of implicit and explicit bias on mock juror decision-making.192
The first of these studies examined the behavior of 104 undergraduate mock jurors. 193 The authors hypothesized that mock jurors who
self-reported high levels of explicit racial bias would show strong
race-of-defendant bias, and those with low self-reported scores
would show a more nuanced pattern. 194 Mock jurors participating in
the study read a summary of a death penalty trial and were told they
would participate in the sentencing phase of the trial. 195 They were
then shown a video of five other student jurors who advocated for
the death sentence. 196 Mock jurors were randomly assigned to treatment groups where the race of the defendant was varied between
White and Black and the race of one of the five jurors was varied
between White and Black—the remaining jurors were White. 197
Mock jurors were asked how likely they were to recommend the
death penalty on a seven-point scale, with higher scores indicating
they were more likely to recommend a death sentence. 198 Statistical
tests revealed that high-prejudice mock jurors were more punitive
towards the Black defendant than the White defendant regardless of

See, e.g., id. at 195 n.5.
My goal is to remind scholars of the importance of explicit bias rather than
criticize individual researchers, so I have omitted citations. See generally Justin
D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 311
(2010) (reviewing studies of implicit bias).
192
John F. Dovidio et al., Racial Attitudes and the Death Penalty, 27 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1468, 1480 (1997) [hereinafter Racial Attitudes]; Nature of
Prejudice, supra note 142, at 530–35.
193
Racial Attitudes, supra note 192, at 1472–73.
194
Id. at 1472.
195
Id. at 1473.
196
Id. at 1473–74.
197
Id. at 1473.
198
Id. at 1474.
190
191
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the racial composition of the mock jury. 199 Low-prejudice mock jurors reported the lowest mean sentencing scores when the jury was
all White and the defendant was Black. 200 However, when a Black
juror advocated for the death penalty, low-prejudice mock jurors
were significantly more likely to recommend death for the Black
defendant. 201 These results support the authors’ hypothesis that explicit racism affects decision-making in more direct ways, and implicit biases operate in more subtle, indirect ways. 202
The second seminal study by Dovidio and colleagues, which included thirty-three undergraduate mock jurors, also examined the
effects of implicit and explicit bias on determinations of guilt. 203 After completing IATs and explicit bias diagnostics, mock jurors were
told they would be participating in an unrelated study and were
asked to assess the guilt of a Black defendant accused of an interracial, double-murder before assessing the guilt of a Black defendant
accused of assaulting a White man. 204 Statistical tests showed that
measures of explicit racial bias were highly correlated with ratings
of guilt. 205 In contrast, there was no evidence that measures of implicit bias were associated with ratings of guilt. 206 Based on these
results, the authors concluded implicit bias is most relevant to spontaneous race-related decisions, while explicit bias is more relevant
to deliberative race-related decisions like assessing guilt. 207
Id. at 1478 (reporting the results of an ANCOVA showing that high-prejudiced mock jurors’ adjusted mean sentencing scores were significantly higher (F
= 4.37, p < 0.04) for the Black defendant treatment (M = 4.70) than the White
defendant treatment (M = 3.71)).
200
Id. at 1477, 1480 (reporting higher adjusted mean sentencing scores for
both men (M = 2.49 versus M = 4.82) and women (M = 2.18 versus M = 4.18)
when the jury was all White and the defendant was Black).
201
Id. at 1478, 1480 (reporting low-prejudiced mock jurors were more likely
to sentence the Black defendant to death when a Black juror was present (t = 3.07,
p < 0.01) and more likely to sentence the Black defendant to death than a White
defendant when a Black juror was present (t = 1.74, p < 0.04)).
202
Id. at 1480.
203
Nature of Prejudice, supra note 142, at 521–22.
204
Id. at 521–22.
205
Id. at 523–24 (reporting a statistically significant Pearson’s correlation coefficients for scores on the Old-Fashioned Racism Scale (r = 0.51, p < 0.003) and
Modern Racism Scale (r = 0.48, p < 0.033) but not a word-completion IAT (r =
- 0.15, p < 0.432)).
206
Id. at 523.
207
See id. at 524.
199
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D.

Contradictory Studies and the Shift Towards Implicit Bias
Despite the findings of Dovidio and colleagues, which provide
evidence that race-of-defendant bias is moderated by explicit racial
bias, research in the years that followed showed a methodological
shift away from measures of explicit bias towards measures of implicit bias, which many view as the key to reconciling conflicting
studies. 208 In recent years, numerous legal scholars have described
racism as almost entirely implicit in nature and have dismissed explicit racism as a relic of the past, often not even mentioning it.209
Additionally, the few recent studies that have considered the relationship between explicit bias and juror decision-making have
yielded conflicting results. 210
In contrast to the two studies led by Dovidio, a 2004 experimental study of mock juror decision-making published by Belle L.
Bottoms and colleagues found no evidence that high-prejudiced
mock jurors made more racially biased guilt judgments than lowprejudiced mock jurors in child sexual abuse cases. 211 However, it
is important to note that the 228 university students included in the
study were from a socioeconomically and racially diverse university, were told not to be swayed by prejudice, and likely had a strong
motivation to give socially desirable answers. 212 Moreover, juror racial bias is likely moderated by case type, and guilt judgments in
sexual abuse cases may not show the same patterns as guilt judgments in capital cases. 213
In 2010, Levinson and Young examined the association between
implicit and explicit bias and juror decision-making. 214 The authors
Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124,
1126 (2012).
209
See Selmi, supra note 37, at 195 n.5, 219–22 (discussing research on implicit bias and its pervasiveness).
210
See Mitchell et al., supra note 27, at 621.
211
Bette L. Bottoms et al., Effects of Victim and Defendant Race on Jurors’
Decisions in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 16
(2004) (reporting non-significant logistic regression results (p > 0.05) for juror
prejudice level (Wald = 0.04, p = 0.84), victim race (Wald = 1.80, p = 0.22), defendant race (Wald = 0.27, p = 0.61), and all interaction terms (all Wald’s ≤ .87,
all p-values ≥ 0.35)).
212
Id. at 24–25.
213
See generally Mazzella & Feingold, supra note 27, at 1315–38 (examining
heterogeneity in juror decision-making by crime type).
214
Levinson & Young, supra note 191, at 308, 339–40.
208
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presented sixty-six jury-eligible university students with a description of a robbery and had them evaluate the strength of evidence,
including a still image where the perpetrator’s forearm was visible—his complexion was varied between light and dark depending
on the treatment group. 215 Participants completed two measures of
explicit bias, two IATs, rated how inculpatory each piece of evidence was, and rated the guilt of the defendant on a 100-point scale,
with higher scores indicating higher confidence. 216
Mock jurors in the treatment group that saw the image of the
defendant with his complexion darkened perceived the evidence as
more inculpatory and viewed the defendant as more guilty than
those who saw the same man with a light complexion. 217 The authors found no evidence that explicit bias had an effect on guilt judgments. 218 The authors concluded that the race-of-defendant bias observed was implicit in nature because many mock jurors could not
consistently remember the race of the defendant at the end of the
study, and IAT scores were correlated with biased evidence judgments. 219 When interpreting these results, it is important to note that
the study was conducted in Hawaii, which has a unique cultural history that is atypical for the United States, and only eighteen of the
sixty-six participants were of European descent. 220
More recently, in 2014, Levinson and colleagues conducted an
experimental study of mock juror behavior that included 445 juryeligible participants from Alabama, California, Florida, Oklahoma,
Id. at 331–34.
Id.
217
Id. at 337 (reporting MANCOVA results indicating that mock jurors
viewed the evidence as significantly more inculpatory (F = 4.84, p = 0.032) when
the defendant had a dark complexion (m = 86.23) than when he had a light complexion (m = 80.49) and considered the defendant with the dark complexion significantly (F = 4.40, p = 0.034) more guilty (m = 66.97) than the defendant with
the light complexion (m = 56.37)).
218
Id. at 338 (reporting that all correlations and logistic regression coefficients
had non-significant p-values (p > 0.5)).
219
Id. For more information on the IAT study, which was published separately, see Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not
Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 187, 206 (2010) (reporting regression results showing mock jurors with higher Black/Guilty (β =
0.25, t = 2.23, p < 0.05) and Black/Unpleasantness (β = 0.34, t = 3.04, p < 0.05)
IAT scores were more likely to judge ambiguous evidence as indicative of guilt)).
220
Levinson & Young, supra note 191, at 335–36.
215
216
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and Texas. 221 Death-qualified mock jurors read a description of a
shooting with the race of the defendant and race of the victim varied
in a 2 × 2 design, viewed an evidence slideshow, read victim impact
testimony, and took two IATs and an explicit bias test. 222 The results
showed no evidence of race-of-defendant or race-of-victim bias or a
significant interaction between the treatments. 223 However, mock
jurors who strongly associated White with worth, and Black with
worthlessness, on a “value of life” IAT were significantly more
likely to sentence the Black defendant to death than the White defendant. 224 Mock jurors with higher explicit bias scores were also
significantly more likely to sentence a defendant accused of killing
a White victim to death. 225
In summary, although there is strong empirical evidence of raceof-victim bias, empirical evidence of race-of-defendant bias appears
to show a more complex relationship moderated by other variables—with measures of authoritarianism, trust in the legal system,
implicit racial bias, and explicit racial bias offering promising candidates. 226 Studies of national survey data add credence to this interpretation. 227 Support for the death penalty among White respondents
has been consistently higher than among Black respondents. 228 Research also shows that an estimated one-third of this White-Black
racial divide in support for the death penalty can be attributed to
White racism, and rates of support for the death penalty are similar
between non-racist Whites and African Americans. 229 Finally,
Levinson et al., supra note 26, at 553.
Id. at 554–56.
223
Id. at 561 (reporting non-significant logistic regression results for the race
of defendant variable, the race of victim variable, and their interaction (all p-values > 0.5)).
224
Id. at 562–63 (reporting statistically significant logistic regression results
(β = -1.77, p < 0.05)).
225
Id. (reporting statistically significant logistic regression results (β = -1.77,
p < 0.05)).
226
James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Racial Divide in Support for
the Death Penalty: Does White Racism Matter?, 85 SOC. FORCES 1281, 1281
(2007).
227
Amy L. Anderson et al., Age, Period, and Cohort Effects on Death Penalty
Attitudes in the United States, 1974-2014, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 833, 853–54 (2017).
228
Unnever & Cullen, supra note 226, at 1281; Anderson et al., supra note
227, at 853–54 (2017).
229
Unnever & Cullen, supra note 226, at 1281.
221
222
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explicit measures of bias, authoritarianism, and trust in government
also show a strong association with support for the death penalty in
survey research. 230
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The present article reports the results of one of the largest experimental studies of mock juror decision-making published to date. I
surveyed 3,284 respondents using Amazon Mechanical Turk
(“MTurk”). 231 Respondents were paid approximately $1.50 to answer questions and make a sentencing decision in a mock capital
trial with the race of the defendant and victim varied in a 3 × 3 experimental design. In the past, it was more difficult and expensive
to recruit large samples of study participants, so many researchers
relied on college students. 232 However, in recent years, widespread
use of the Internet across demographic groups has drastically reduced the expense and increased the external validity of large-scale,
online survey research. 233 Research shows that experimental studies
conducted with MTurk generalize well to the results of studies conducted using nationally representative samples. 234
Although both experimental and observational studies have
yielded important results and offer insight into mock juror behavior,

230
Joe Soss et al., Why Do White Americans Support the Death Penalty?, 65
J. POLIT. 397, 397–421 (2003); Steven Stack, Authoritarianism and Support for
the Death Penalty: A Multivariate Analysis, 36 SOC. FOCUS 333, 333 (2003).
231
AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com (last visited May
10, 2021).
232
Krista Casler et al., Separate but Equal? A Comparison of Participants and
Data Gathered Via Amazon’s Mturk, Social Media, and Face-to-Face Behavioral
Testing, 29 COMPUT. HUM. BEHAV. 2156, 2156 (2013).
233
Id.
234
Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351, 351–
66 (2012) (“the estimates of average treatment effects are similar in the MTurk
and original samples”); Alexander Coppock, Generalizing from Survey Experiments Conducted on Mechanical Turk: A Replication Approach, 7 POL. SCI.
RSCH. METHODS 613, 613–28 (2019) (finding the results did not differ much and
were “relatively homogenous”); see also Scott Clifford et al., Are Samples Drawn
From Mechanical Turk Valid for Research on Political Ideology?, 2 RSCH. &
POLS. 1, 7–8 (2015).
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experimental approaches provide several distinct advantages. 235 Observational studies require a researcher to control for numerous covariates, which adds a degree of subjectivity. 236 In contrast, random
assignment to treatment and control groups in experimental studies
reduces or eliminates problems with omitted variable bias. 237 While
divorced from the setting of actual trials, in experimental studies, a
researcher can manipulate variables like the race of the defendant
and victim. 238 Finally, experimental designs allow researchers to
generate data by recruiting participants, which allows statistical
analysis of large samples that do not require the researcher to wait
on the outcomes of actual trials. 239 On the contrary, observational
studies often include data that is decades old to generate larger samples, which reduces their contemporary relevance. 240
A.
Setting
Every empirical study is a product of its time. I conducted this
study during November 2020. A once-in-a-century global pandemic
raged unabated; police killings of unarmed African Americans—including George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Daniel Prude, Jonathan
Price, and many others—sparked national outrage; the Black Lives
Matter movement gained significant national attention; and racial
justice protests spread throughout the country. 241 Joe Biden had
See Susan Athey & Guido W. Imbens, The Econometrics of Randomized
Experiments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC FIELD EXPERIMENTS 73, 78 (2017)
(comparing experimental and observational studies).
236
Kevin A. Clarke, Return of the Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias
in Political Research, 26 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 46, 47 (2009).
237
GUIDO W. IMBENS & DONALD B. RUBIN, CAUSAL INFERENCE OF
STATISTICS, SOCIAL, AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 31–32 (2015).
238
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meta-Analysis: A Primer for Legal Scholars, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 201, 211 (2007).
239
See Bornstein et al., infra note 334, at 18.
240
See, e.g., Baumgartner et al., supra note 24, at 211 (meta-analyzing data
from 1972 to 2008); Eberhardt et al., supra note 34, at 384–85 (studying death
penalty cases from 1979 to 1999).
241
Susan Page & Veronica Bravo, The Year That Was: A Global Pandemic,
Racial Protests, a President-elect. Oh, and Impeachment., USA TODAY (Dec. 28,
2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/2020/
12/28/2020-trump-biden-racial-justice-election-covid-rbg/3822810001; Erika D.
Smith, 2020 Was the Year America Embraced Black Lives Matter as a Movement,
Not Just a Moment, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.la
times.com/california/story/2020-12-16/black-lives-matter-protests-george-floyd235
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recently won a contentious presidential election, and his opponent,
incumbent Donald Trump, disputed the election results as his presidency waned. 242 White nationalist and other extremist movements
also gained momentum. 243 Many of these groups demonstrated
against Black Lives Matter protests, COVID-19 restrictions, and
perceived election fraud, often in combat regalia with automatic
weapons. 244 The political polarization and racial issues characteristic of 2020 undoubtedly shaped public opinion on crime and punishment and will continue to do so in the future. 245
B.
Study Population
The self-reported demographic characteristics of the mock jurors who participated in this study were similar to 2019 U.S. Census
figures with some notable exceptions. 246 Black, Latino or Hispanic,
and older mock jurors were underrepresented in this study relative
to U.S. Census figures. 247 When evaluating these differences, it is
important to acknowledge that screening procedures used in actual
trials, and incorporated into this study, are likely to bias jury pools
in similar directions relative to the U.S. population.
In contrast to the U.S. Census, I disqualified respondents who
were felons and non-citizens and limited the study to English-speakers only following standard jury selection procedures. 248 Excluding
felons from this study lowered the percentage of Black respondents
from 10.1% to 9%. Citizenship and English language requirements
also likely reduced the number of respondents who identified as
coronavirus-covid-2020; Stephanie Zacharek, 2020 Tested Us Beyond Measure.
Where Do We Go from Here?, TIME (Dec. 14, 2020, 6:45 AM), https://time.
com/5917394/2020-in-review.
242
Hope Yen, Ali Swenson & Amanda Seitz, AP FACT CHECK: Trump’s
claims of vote rigging are all wrong, AP NEWS (Dec. 3, 2020), https://apnews.
com/article/election-2020-ap-fact-check-joe-biden-donald-trump-technology49a24edd6d10888dbad61689c24b05a5.
243
Sarah Slobin & Sam Hart, When the Right Wing Rallies, REUTERS (Apr.
15, 2021), https://graphics.reuters.com/USA-CAPITOL/SECURITY/xegpbxoad
pq.
244
Id.
245
See Smith, supra note 241.
246
See QuickFacts: United States, supra note 21.
247
See id.
248
Juror Qualifications, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/jury-service/juror-qualifications (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
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Hispanic or Latino. 249 Moreover, I only allowed respondents to pick
one racial group in contrast to the U.S. Census, which encourages
respondents who identify as Hispanic or Latino to pick an additional
racial group or multiple groups. 250 Finally, although older mock jurors were underrepresented in this study, there is evidence that jury
selection methods result in a similar bias. 251 Jurors over sixty-five
years old are often excused or exempted from jury duty, and studies
suggest that voir dire processes discriminate against older Americans. 252 Race, sex, and age data are reported in Table 1. Complete
demographic data is reported in Appendix A.

See Abby Budiman et al., Facts on U.S. Immigrants, 2018, PEW RESEARCH
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/20/fact
s-on-u-s-immigrants/.
250
See QuickFacts: United States, supra note 21.
251
See generally Max B. Rothman et al., Jury Selection in Aging America:
The New Discrimination?, 2 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 69, 69–80 (2000) (discussing how exclusions, exemptions, and preemptive challenges impact age demographics of jury pools); Shamena Anwar et al., The Role of Age in Jury Selection and Trial Outcomes, 57 J.L. & ECON. 1001, 1001–30 (2014) (discussing how
prosecutors and defense attorneys use peremptory challenges to alter the age composition of jury pools).
252
Rothman et al., supra note 251, at 70.
249
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TABLE 1
RACE, SEX, AND AGE STATISTICS FOR MOCK JURORS WHO
PARTICIPATED IN THIS STUDY VERSUS 2019 U.S. CENSUS
STATISTICS

C.
Death Qualification
Survey respondents were asked for informed consent before answering a death qualification question designed to meet the legal
standard outlined in Wainwright v. Witt:
If you were selected to serve on a jury where the defendant faces the possibility of the death penalty, do
you have such strong feelings about the death penalty
that these sentiments would seriously affect you as a
juror and prevent or substantially impair your performance in accordance with instructions from the court
and your oath as juror?
Answer “No” if you would be able to objectively determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence and would
be willing to consider both life in prison without
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parole and the death penalty as possible sentences.
Answer “Yes” if you would be unable to do so. 253
D.
Treatment Groups
Respondents who passed the death qualification by answering
“No” were presented with a description of a robbery-turned-homicide. I used a 3 × 3 experimental design where the race of the defendant and the race of the victim presented to mock jurors were
selected at random. As illustrated in Figure 1, the defendant was described as 1) “White” and depicted with a “police sketch” of a man
with a light complexion and green eyes, 2) “Black” and depicted
with an image of the same man with a darker complexion and brown
eyes, or 3) “Black” and depicted with an image of the same man
with his eye color and complexion darkened further. I either 1) left
the victim’s race ambiguous, 2) described him as “White,” or 3) described him as “Black.” The number of respondents for each of the
nine defendant-victim combinations are reported in Table 2.

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (explaining the standard “for
determining when a propsective juror may be excluded” because of his or her
views on capital punishment is “whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or
sbustantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with
his instructions and his oath’”).
253
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FIGURE 1
“POLICE SKETCHES” PRESENTED TO SURVEY RESPONDENTS IN THE
THREE DEFENDANT TREATMENT GROUPS

TABLE 2
MOCK JURORS RANDOMLY ASSIGNED TO EACH TREATMENT GROUP

E.
Study Design
I chose racially ambiguous first names and generic last names
for the defendant and the victim and gave them realistic ages based
on FBI statistics. 254 I described the murder as occurring during a
robbery to add an aggravating factor and noted that the defendant
had a difficult childhood and grew up in poverty to add mitigating
factors. I made the prompt extremely general and loosely consistent
with the facts that led to Turner v. Murray, where Turner appealed
his conviction for shooting a store owner in front of an eyewitness. 255 I also informed mock jurors that the defendant had been
convicted and included truncated sentencing instructions based on
federal guidelines. 256 Finally, I asked mock jurors to determine sentencing.
254
2019 Crime in the United States: Expanded Homicide Data Table 3—Murder Offenders by Age, Sex, Race, and Ethnicity, 2019, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-3.xls (May 11, 2021); 2019 Crime in the United States: Expanded Homicide
Data Table 9—Murder Victims by Age by Weapon, 2019, FBI, https://ucr.
fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/tables/expanded-homicidedata-table-9.xls (May 11, 2021).
255
See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 30 (1986).
256
See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994); Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 876–77 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163–65 (1976).
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Mock jurors randomly assigned to the Black defendant (light
complexion) treatment and the Black victim treatment saw the following question:
Randy Jones, a twenty-nine year old Black man, was
convicted of a brutal murder during a robbery. 257 He
showed little remorse for shooting Shawn Davis, a
twenty-seven year old Black man, in front of an eyewitness. 258 Evidence was introduced that Jones had a
difficult childhood and grew up in poverty.
Police sketch of Jones 259

You are on the jury and are asked to determine sentencing. The judge instructs you to weigh any aggravating and mitigating factors and to determine if any
aggravating factors identified sufficiently outweigh
any mitigating factors identified to justify a sentence
of death.
What is the most appropriate sentence? Life in prison
without parole or the death penalty?

The defendant was described as “White” or “Black” depending on the treatment group, and his complexion was varied.
258
The victim’s race was omitted, or he was described as “Black” or “White”
depending on the treatment group.
259
If the defendant was described as “White” Figure 1.1., supra, was shown.
If the defendant was described as “Black” Figure 1.2. or Figure 1.3., supra, was
shown.
257
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F.
Formulating Mock Juror Questions
When formulating questions to screen for racial bias, I selected
three subtle questions because I thought they would elicit more
truthful answers than longer instruments, like the Old-Fashioned
Racism Scale or the Modern Racism Scale, which ask questions that
are obviously about race and often have clearly socially acceptable
answers. 260 I also selected this approach because asking a few simple questions is more realistic to actual voir dire practices. 261 Based
on research by Devine and Caughlin, I hypothesized that mock jurors who had a high degree of respect for state authority and believed
the legal system was fair to African Americans, despite historical
and contemporary evidence to the contrary, would be more racially
biased. 262 I also hypothesized that respondents who were unempathetic to the fact that life circumstances are often the product of socio-historical forces would be more racially biased based on research by Lynch and Haney. 263 Finally, I chose a question that subtly inquired into racial attitudes by assessing respondents’ fear of
African Americans that I adapted from the 1990 General Social Survey. 264 In contrast to an actual trial, I asked my three voir dire questions after mock jurors made a sentencing decision to avoid alerting

See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with
Green Socks-Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78
CHI-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1194–96 (2003) (discussing jurors’ desire to avoid embarrassment and answer questions in socially desirable ways); see generally John
B. McConahay et al., Has Racism Declined in America? It Depends on Who Is
Asking and What Is Asked, 25 J. CONFLICT RESOLUT. 563, 563–79 (1981); John
B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale., in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 91, 91–125 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (discussing modern racism).
261
See Hans & Jehle, supra note 260, at 1194.
262
Devine & Caughlin, supra note 27, at 122 (discussing trust in the legal
system and authoritarianism).
263
See Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White
Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition and the “Empathic Divide,” 45 L. &
SOC’Y. REV. 69, 75 (2011) (discussing why many White jurors fail to empathize
with Black defendants).
264
General Social Survey Data Explorer, NORC AT THE UNIV. OF CHI.,
https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/variables/1215/vshow (last visited Oct. 27,
2021).
260
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them that the study was about racial issues. 265 The three voir dire
questions I asked were:
1.

The criminal justice system is biased against
Black people. True or False?

2.

People who have faced difficult life circumstances are less responsible for their crimes.
True or False?

3.

Would you feel safe living in a neighborhood
where half your neighbors were Black? Yes
or No?

Because some studies show that survey respondents are more
likely to answer in the affirmative, I required answers in the affirmative and negative. 266 I also randomly varied the question and response order. Mock jurors who answered “True” to question one,
“False” to question two, and “Yes” to question three, failed the voir
dire. Next, I asked disqualifying questions designed to eliminate felons, those facing felony charges, non-citizens, and minors from the
sample of survey respondents. 267 Finally, I asked mock jurors nine
demographic questions. Disqualifying questions and demographic
questions are reported in Appendix B.
G.
Statistical Approach
After completing the survey, I defined the variables reported in
Table 3 in order to estimate the causal effects of the treatments using

In an experimental setting, it is difficult to determine if asking questions
about race in voir dire reminds jurors of their own biases and not to act on these
biases, or if it simply encourages them to respond in ways they assume are desirable to the researcher. See generally Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity
and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition
on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCH. 597, 597–612 (2006) (discussing mock juror decision-making when racial issues were raised during voir
dire in an experimental context).
266
See Ozan Kuru & Josh Pasek, Improving Social Media Measurement in
Surveys: Avoiding Acquiescence Bias in Facebook Research, 57 COMPUTS. HUM.
BEHAV. 82, 82. (2016) (discussing acquiescence bias in online surveys).
267
Juror Qualifications, supra note 248.
265
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a potential outcomes framework. 268 Causal inference requires several assumptions. 269 Assignment must be individualistic, meaning a
respondent’s assignment to treatment did not depend on the values
of covariates or potential outcomes of other respondents; probabilistic, meaning there is a non-zero probability that every respondent
could have received any one of the treatments; and unconfounded,
meaning the assignment mechanism did not depend on potential outcomes. 270 Random assignment to treatment groups largely addresses
these problems. 271

268
For a binary treatment 𝑤𝑤 ∈ {0,1}, potential outcomes of treatment w for
individual i can be defined as 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (1) and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (0). Although only 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (1) or 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (0) can
be observed and Δ𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (1) – 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (0) cannot be directly observed, in a randomized
experiment where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ) and 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ⫫ {𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (1), 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (0)}, the estimator of the ATE
(𝜏𝜏̂ ) is unbiased:
𝔼𝔼[𝜏𝜏̂ ] = 𝔼𝔼[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (1) ] − 𝔼𝔼[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (0) ] = 𝜏𝜏
Notably, for the purposes here it is possible to estimate the ATE (𝜏𝜏̂ ) with ordinary
least squares regression:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏̂ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
This flexible model can accommodate additional treatment groups, covariates,
and interaction terms. See Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 688, 696–
98 (1974) [hereinafter Estimating Causal Effects]; Donald B. Rubin, Assignment
to Treatment Group on the Basis of a Covariate, 2 J. EDUC. STATS. 1, 1–26 (1977)
[hereinafter Assignment]; Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N 945, 945–60 (1986); JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN
PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION
11–24 (2008).
269
See IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 237, at 31.
270
See id.
271
See id. at 40–41.
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TABLE 3
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS USED IN LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS

I estimated two multinomial logistic regressions to determine if
there was evidence indicating that the random assignment of survey
respondents to treatment groups was flawed. These regressions
showed no evidence of significant imbalances between treatment
groups and are reported in Appendix C. I also limited participation
to respondents with unique U.S. IP addresses to strengthen the individualistic assignment assumption. After assessing the model assumptions, I analyzed the data by running four linear probability
models, a form of ordinary least squares regression, which I selected
instead of logistic regression for ease of interpretability. 272 Finally,
I conducted post-hoc Monte Carlo simulations to contextualize the
results.

See Robin Gomila, Logistic or Linear? Estimating Causal Effects of Experimental Treatments on Binary Outcomes Using Regression Analysis, 150 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 700, 700–709 (2021) (discussing why linear models are easier to interpret, unbiased, and safer for modelling the causal effects of
treatments on binary outcomes).
272
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IV. RESULTS
A.
Linear Probability Model One
The first linear probability model I ran regressed the Death Eligible variable on the Voir Dire and Demographic variables. 273 The
regression results showed a significant collective effect (F(20, 3263)
= 8.306 p < 0.001) and are reported in Table 4.
TABLE 4
RESULTS OF LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL ONE

273
Results were calculated with robust standard errors. Significance codes are
reported as follows: p < 0.001***, p < 0.01**, and p < 0.05*.
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B.
Linear Probability Model Two
The second linear probability I ran regressed the Death Sentence
variable on an interaction of the Defendant and Victim treatments,
controlling for Voir Dire and the Demographic variables. 274 The regression results showed a collective significant effect (F(28, 2367)
= 7.597 p < 0.001) and are reported in Table 5. 275 Predicted probabilities and simple effects are reported in Appendix D.

Results were calculated with robust standard errors. Significance codes are
reported as follows: p < 0.001***, p < 0.01**, and p < 0.05*.
275
Results were calculated with robust standard errors and averaged over the
levels of Age, Death Penalty State, Education, Sex, Politics, Income, Race, and
Religion.
274
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TABLE 5
RESULTS FROM LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL TWO

Because I was interested in assessing whether mock jurors were
more punitive against the Black defendant of dark complexion relative to the Black defendant of light complexion based on the race of
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the victim, I calculated the additional interactions not captured by
the regression reported in Table 5. The effect of darkening the defendant’s complexion (Black (Dark) × Black (Light)) on sentencing
was not statistically significant for the Black versus Ambiguous (𝛽𝛽
= -0.046, t = -0.776, p = 0.438), White versus Ambiguous (𝛽𝛽 = 0.058, t = -0.996, p = 0.319), or Black versus White (𝛽𝛽 = -0.013, t =
-0.214, p = 0.831) victim treatments.
C.
Linear Probability Model Three
The third linear probability model I ran regressed the Death Sentence variable on an interaction of the Voir Dire variable and the
Victim treatments, controlling for the Defendant treatments and Demographic variables. The regression results showed a collective significant effect (F(26, 2369) = 8.159 p < 0.001) and are reported in
Table 6. 276 Predicted probabilities and simple effects are reported in
Appendix E. I was also interested in whether mock jurors who failed
voir dire would be less punitive against a defendant convicted of
killing a Black victim relative to a White victim, so I calculated an
additional interaction. The interaction comparing the effect of failing voir dire (Failed – Passed) on sentencing for the Black versus
White victim treatments was not statistically significant (𝛽𝛽 = -0.074,
t = 0.983, p = 0.325).

The interaction of the Black versus White victim treatment by voir dire
status, which was omitted from the regression table, was not statistically significant (-0.074, p = 0.325). Results were calculated with robust standard errors and
averaged over the levels of the Age, Death Penalty State, Education, Sex, Politics,
Income, Race, and Religion variables. Significance codes are reported as follows:
p < 0.001***, p < 0.01**, and p < 0.05*.
276
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TABLE 6
RESULTS FROM LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL THREE

D.
Linear Probability Model Four
The fourth and final linear probability model regressed the
Death Sentence variable on an interaction of the Voir Dire variable
and Defendant treatments, controlling for the Victim treatments and
the Demographic variables. The regression results reported in Table
7 showed a collective significant effect (F(26, 2369) = 8.432, p <
0.001), and there were two significant interaction effects. 277 Predicted probabilities and simple effects are reported in Appendix F.
Because I was interested in whether mock jurors who failed voir dire
would be more punitive against the Black defendant of darker complexion relative to the defendant of lighter complexion, I calculated
an additional interaction. The interaction comparing the effect of
failing voir dire (Failed – Passed) on sentencing for the Black (Dark)
versus Black (Light) defendant treatments was not statistically significant (𝛽𝛽 = -0.001, t = 0.013, p = 0.989).

Results were calculated with robust standard errors and averaged over the
levels of Age, Death Penalty State, Education, Sex, Politics, Income, Race, and
Religion. Significance codes are reported as follows: p < 0.001***, p < 0.01**,
and p < 0.05*.
277
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TABLE 7
RESULTS FROM LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL FOUR

The results of linear probability model four showed that mock
jurors who failed voir dire were 18.3% to 18.4% more likely to sentence a Black defendant to death than a white defendant ceteris paribus. To illustrate how these mock jurors skewed the probability a
Black defendant would receive a death sentence, I plotted the predicted probability that each death-eligible mock juror (n = 2,396)
would sentence the three defendants to death when the victim’s race
was ambiguous in Figure 2 (Frames 1–3). Next, I removed the jurors
who failed voir dire (n = 285) and plotted the predicted probabilities
for the remaining jurors (n = 2,111) in Figure 2 (Frames 4–6).
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FIGURE 2
PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A DEATH SENTENCE FOR EACH
DEFENDANT TREATMENT

E.
Monte Carlo Analysis
After analyzing the results of the linear probability models, I
conducted a Monte Carlo simulation to contextualize the effects of
the death qualification. I randomly selected twelve mock jurors with
replacement 1,000,000 times from the full venire and then from the
death-qualified venire. Next, I calculated the probability of empaneling mock jurors who failed the voir dire questions and made racially biased sentencing decisions from both groups. The probability
of empaneling racially biased mock jurors from the full venire, the
probability of empaneling racially biased mock jurors from the
death-qualified venire, and the associated absolute risk increase
(“ARI”) and relative risk increase (“RRI”) caused by the death qualification are reported in Table 8.
TABLE 8

PROBABILITY OF EMPANELING ONE OR MORE BIASED JURORS FROM
THE FULL VENIRE VERSUS THE DEATH QUALIFIED VENIRE
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V.
DISCUSSION
The results of this study add to a growing body of research showing that the death qualification process underrepresents African
Americans and overrepresents more punitive jurors in death-qualified venires. 278 Although it is somewhat surprising that I found no
evidence of race-of-victim or race-of-defendant bias for the full
death-qualified venire, and no evidence that darkening the complexion and eye color of the Black defendant increased the probability
that the defendant would receive a death sentence, it is clear that
these results mask a strong undercurrent of racism among a subgroup of respondents. 279 Respondents who failed the voir dire questions screening for racial bias were 18.3% to 18.4% more likely to
sentence a Black defendant to death than a White defendant ceteris
paribus. 280 What is even more troubling is the death qualification
increased the likelihood of empaneling one or more of these racially
biased mock jurors from 72.1% to 78.1%, raising the relative risk of
empaneling a partial juror by 8.4%. 281
In Lockhart v. McCree, the Supreme Court held that the death
qualification does not violate the fair-cross section or impartiality
requirements of the Sixth Amendment even if it underrepresents demographic groups (e.g., African Americans) based on their views
about the death penalty and produces more conviction-prone juries. 282 However, the Supreme Court has never addressed evidence
that the death qualification overrepresents racially biased jurors
278
See, e.g., Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Death Qualification in Black and
White: Racialized Decision Making and Death-Qualified Juries, 40 L. & POL’Y
148, 157–65 (2018); Ann M. Eisenberg, Removal of Women and African Americans in Jury Selection in South Carolina Capital Cases, 1997-2012, 9 NE. UNIV.
L. REV. 299, 335–36 (2017); Levinson et al., supra note 26, at 557–60; Alicia
Summers et al., Death Qualification as Systematic Exclusion of Jurors with Certain Religious and Other Characteristics, 40 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 3218, 3227–
28 (2010); Brooke Butler & Gary Moran, The Impact of Death Qualification, Belief in a Just World, Legal Authoritarianism, and Locus of Control on Venirepersons’ Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 57, 64–65 (2007).
279
See supra Sections IV.B–D.
280
See supra Table 7. Both p-values were statistically significant (Black
(Light): 18.3%, p = 0.012; Black (Dark): 18.4%, p = 0.012).
281
See supra Table 8. The 95% confidence interval for this estimate was
8.29% to 8.54%.
282
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 162 (1986).
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who, unlike conviction-prone jurors, are clearly partial. Accepting
the results of this study as true and generalizable to actual trials, arguendo, the death qualification appears to violate an African American capital defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury
by increasing the likelihood of empaneling jurors who make racially
biased sentencing decisions. 283
There is an inherent contradiction in championing the jury as the
consciousness of the community yet removing prospective jurors
who embrace a widely held, socially acceptable viewpoint like opposition to the death penalty. There is no reason why the judiciary
should allow the state to remove nullifiers, a privilege that arises in
the context of a capital trial but not in a non-capital trial, based on a
charging decision under the state’s control. Allowing the state to remove nullifiers is particularly egregious when the same process
overrepresents racist jurors and underrepresents African American
jurors. It is not surprising that African Americans oppose the death
penalty at much higher rates and are less likely to pass the death
qualification than White Americans given that the death penalty has
been used, and continues to be used, primarily to punish Black defendants. 284 Removing jurors because of viewpoints that are reflective of their racial identity is synonymous with removing them because of their racial identity. The result is unacceptable discrimination.
Voir dire is ill-suited to remedying the underrepresentation of
African Americans caused by the death qualification, 285 and although it may safeguard against empaneling racially biased jurors, it
is not a panacea. Accepting the premise that the death qualification
overrepresents jurors who make racially biased sentencing decisions
as true, it follows that the probability of empaneling one of these
partial jurors will be higher after the death qualification unless voir
dire is highly effective. 286 Although the fact that 10.1% of mock jurors in this study admitted to racial biases suggests that it is possible
See supra Sections IV.B–D; see supra Table 7.
See supra Part I.
285
See ERIC DAVIS, RACE AND VOIR DIRE (2019), https://www.nacdl.org/
getattachment/cd19fea6-e507-483a-9248-3913fcf75e9f/race-and-voir-dire.pdf.
286
See supra Sections IV.B–D; see supra Table 4. Mock jurors who failed
voir dire were significantly more likely to pass the death qualification than those
who passed voir dire (8.8%, p < 0.001).
283
284
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to screen for racial bias, voir dire has significant shortcomings.287
Research shows that voir dire practices not only encourage dishonesty, but are also idiosyncratic across jurisdictions and highly dependent on the skills of the parties involved. 288 Moreover, even after
admitting to bias, jurors are often still empaneled if they agree to be
impartial. 289 As a result, voir dire is unlikely to countervail the threat
the death qualification poses to an African American capital defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
Voir dire inquiry into racial bias should be an absolute right in
capital trials. The mock jurors who failed voir dire questions in this
study made racially biased sentencing decisions against the Black
defendants regardless of the race of the victim, which suggests that
voir dire inquiry into racial biases should not be limited to interracial
crimes. 290 It is also important to emphasize that I asked the voir dire
questions in this study in a semi-anonymous survey, which likely
increased mock juror candor. Courts should consider expanding the
use of questionnaires in voir dire to encourage such honesty. Giving
jury instructions on implicit and explicit bias and ending the practice
of rehabilitating jurors who admit to biases are equally important
steps. However, if the judiciary is serious about mitigating racism in
capital trials, courts must be more willing to accept that statistical
evidence of patterns of bias often imply that there is an unacceptably
high likelihood of individualized bias in a specific trial. After
See infra Appendix A.
See Lynch & Haney, supra note 278, at 148–49; Brian L. Cutler et al., Jury
Selection in Major Controlled Substance Trials: The Need for Extended Voir
Dire, FORENSIC REP. 331, 331–48 (1990); Michael T. Nietzel et al., Effects of Voir
Dire Variations in Capital Trials: A Replication and Extension, 5 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 467, 467–77 (1987); Michael T. Nietzel & Ronald C. Dillehay, The Effects of
Variations in Voir Dire Procedures in Capital Murder Trials, 6 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 1, 1–13 (1982); David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in
the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 245–71 (1980).
289
See Christopher A. Cosper, Rehabilitation of the Juror Rehabilitation Doctrine, 37 GA. L. REV. 1471, 1476–77 (2002).
290
See supra Section IV.D; Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1976)
(finding the “mere fact” that the victim was a white man and the defendants were
Black would not distort the trial and did not suggest a likelihood of racial prejudice); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 193–94 (1981) (finding no
racial antagonism would have affected the jury by in introducing testimony about
the petitioner and her daughter’s relationship, meaning the judge did not have to
inquire further than he did); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33–38 (1986)
(discussing the heightened rule for interracial crimes).
287
288
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identifying vectors of racial bias, courts must be more willing to use
the full gamut of judicial tools to combat it.
A.

The Death Qualification, Race-of-Victim Bias, and Raceof-Defendant Bias in Context
The results of linear probability model one indicated that several
demographic groups were overrepresented in the death-qualified venire as a direct result of the death qualification. 291 These groups included jurors who failed voir dire, political moderates and conservatives, and wealthier respondents. 292 Demographic groups that were
underrepresented in the death qualified venire included Black, religious, and male mock jurors. 293 Although individuals sentenced to
death are disproportionately poor, male, and Black, the death qualification process selected for a more racially biased, more politically
conservative, wealthier, more female, and Whiter venire. 294
Linear probability model two revealed that respondents who
failed the voir dire questions or identified as politically moderate or
conservative were not only overrepresented in the death-qualified
venire, they were also significantly more punitive. 295 Mock jurors in
the thirty-five to forty-four, forty-five to fifty-four, and over fiftyfive age groups were also significantly more likely to sentence a defendant to death than those in the eighteen to twenty-four age
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4. Mock jurors who were more likely to pass the death
qualification included those who failed voir dire (8.8%, p < 0.001) relative to
those who passe; moderates (10.9%, p < 0.001) and conservatives (13.7%, p <
0.001) relative to liberals; and respondent with income from $25,000–49,999
(5.1%, p = 0.023), $50,000–74,999 (5.4%, p = 0.024) or more than $75,000 (6.7%
p = 0.007) relative to those reporting less than $25,000.
293
See supra Table 4. Black respondents were less likely to pass the death
qualification than Whites (-7.3%, p = 0.018), as were religious respondents relative to non-religious respondents (-7.6%, p < 0.001), and males relative to females
(-5.1%, p = 0.001).
294
See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1839, 1857
(1994); Jeffery L. Johnson & Colleen F. Johnson, Poverty and the Death Penalty,
35 J. ECON. ISSUES 517, 521 (2001); QuickFacts: United States, supra note 21.
295
See supra Table 4. Death qualified mock jurors who failed voir dire were
(13.9%, p < 0.001) more punitive than those who passed as were death-qualified
moderates (11.7%, p < 0.001) and conservatives (25.6%, p < 0.001) relative to
liberals.
291
292
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group. 296 Finally, although male respondents were less likely to pass
the death qualification than females, death-qualified males were significantly more likely to sentence a defendant to death than deathqualified females. 297
Between 1972 and 2018, over 60,000 Americans were asked if
they “favor or oppose the death penalty for [persons convicted of]
murder” as part of the General Social Survey (“GSS”). 298 Although
this question is broader than the death qualification in this study, the
two questions are similar and, not surprisingly, show similar
trends. 299 GSS data indicates that, on average, respondents who
identified as Republican or Independent have had more favorable
views of the death penalty than Democrats, as have wealthier relative to poorer, older relative to younger, male relative to female, religious relative to non-religious, and White relative to Black respondents. 300
In a sophisticated statistical analysis of GSS data, Amy L. Anderson and colleagues found evidence that death penalty support
was lowest among the youngest and oldest respondents relative to
middle-aged adults. 301 In this study, older mock jurors were underrepresented in the sample of respondents. Additionally, I grouped
respondents over fifty-years-old into a single age group, which may
have obfuscated a reduction in death penalty support among older
Americans. However, my results may be more realistic to the context of an actual trial because there is evidence that older jurors are
underrepresented in jury pools and discriminated against in voir
dire, further reducing their representation. 302 Anderson and
See supra Table 4. Death qualified respondents in the 35–44 group (10.8%,
p = 0.007), the 45–54 group were (11.4%, p = 0.008), and the over 55 group
(12.1%, p = 0.006) were more punitive than those in the 18–24 group.
297
See supra Table 4. Death-qualified males were more punitive than females
(5.4%, p = 0.008).
298
See Trends: Favor or Oppose Death Penalty for Murder, GSS DATA
EXPLORER, NORC AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/trends/
Civil%20Liberties?measure=cappun (last visited May 21, 2021). I calculated average support for capital punishment (“cappun”) between 1974 and 1978 for demographic groups using the “polviews,” “age,” “sex,” “race,” “degree,” “realinc,”
“relig” GSS variables.
299
See id.
300
See id.
301
Anderson et al., supra note 227, at 841–42.
302
See supra Part III.B.
296
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colleagues also reported a complex relationship between religious
ideology and support for the death penalty, noting lower levels of
support for all religious groups relative to evangelical Protestants. 303
The authors concluded that as the United States is becoming less
Protestant, less White, and less Republican, these groups are becoming increasingly supportive of the death penalty. 304 My finding that
mock jurors who reported they were religious were less likely to
pass the death qualification may be attributable to shifting demographic and religious trends. It is equally important to acknowledge
that I did not consider inter-denominational variability, which may
have helped elucidate more nuanced trends.
When Anderson and colleagues considered race and gender,
they found persistently lower levels of death penalty support among
Black respondents relative to White respondents and among female
respondents relative to male respondents. 305 While my results show
that Black respondents were less likely to pass the death qualification than White respondents, which corresponds with GSS trends, in
contrast, respondents identifying as female were more likely to pass
the death qualification than males in this study. 306 Although this discrepancy may relate to methodological differences between the GSS
survey and this study, past empirical research on mock juror behavior is consistent with the GSS data. 307 In general, experimental research shows that death-qualified jurors are more likely to be male,
White, biased against out-groups, conviction prone, and death prone
than jury pools in general. 308 It is important to note, however, that
Anderson et al., supra note 227, at 856–57.
Id. at 859.
305
Id. at 847, 853.
306
See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
307
See Lynch & Haney, supra note 278, at 157.
308
See id. at 157–59; Eisenberg, supra note 278, at 304–05, 336; Levinson et
al., supra note 26, at 558–59; Summers et al., supra note 278, at 3227–28; Butler
& Moran, supra note 278, at 65; Joseph W. Filkins et al., An Evaluation of the
Biasing Effects of Death Qualification, in THEORY AND RSCH. ON SMALL GRPS.
153, 161, 163–65, 168–70 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 2002); Claudia L. Cowan
et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and
on the Quality of Deliberation., 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 67–69, 73–75 (1984);
Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the DeathQualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 126–28 (1984); William C.
Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 109–11 (1984).
303
304
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although males were less likely to pass the death qualification than
females in this study, death-qualified males were significantly more
likely than death-qualified females to recommend a death sentence. 309 This complexity suggests that males have more polarized
views of the death penalty with larger proportions strongly opposed
or strongly in favor of it.
After examining demographic trends, I assessed race-of-victim
bias. I found no statistically significant evidence of race-of-victim
bias for the full death-qualified venire and no statistically significant
evidence that mock jurors who failed voir dire were more likely to
sentence a defendant to death based on the race of the victim
alone. 310 These results were surprising given the robust statistical
evidence of race-of-victim bias across geographic, temporal, and
methodological contexts. 311 However, it is important to consider
that many observational studies that have reported evidence of raceof-victim bias relied on trial data that was decades old at the time of
publication. 312 While it is possible that race-of-victim bias may have
been more pronounced in the past, I think it is more likely that these
discrepancies relate to methodological differences between studies.
In actual trials, which observational studies rely on, jurors are often
shown pictures of the victim or can determine the victim’s race from
testimony, the race of the victim’s family, or other factors. 313 Research also shows that experimental studies that include more realistic prompts, like images of the defendant and victim, more consistently uncover evidence of bias. 314 In this study, I either omitted the
Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.C–D.
311
See, e.g., Baumgartner et al., supra note 24, at 214–19 (discussing research
on race-of-victim bias and reporting new empirical findings).
312
See generally id. at 210 (reporting the results of a study analyzing data from
1976–2013); Eberhardt et al., supra note 34, at 383–84 (analyzing data from 1979
to 1999); Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., The Race of Defendants and Victims in Pennsylvania Death Penalty Decisions: 2000–2010, 37 JUST. Q. 955, 956 (2020) (analyzing data from 2000 to 2010).
313
See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (analyzing the constitutional right to voir dire inquiry into racial basis where the jury was aware of the
victim’s race).
314
See Sweeney & Haney, supra note 27, at 190. But see Levinson et al., supra
note 26, at 557–61 (finding that race-of-victim or race-of-defendant bias were
moderated by measures of implicit and explicit bias in a recent experimental study
that omitted images of the defendant and victim).
309
310
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victim’s race or described his race in words only. In contrast, I described the defendant’s race in words and depicted him with an image. As a result, the victim racial cues were likely weaker than the
defendant racial cues, and my models may have underestimated
race-of-victim bias.
When I considered race-of-defendant bias in linear probability
model two, it was less surprising that I failed to uncover statistically
significant evidence of bias in the full death-qualified venire. 315
Meta-analyses of race-of-defendant bias have yielded mixed results;
effect sizes have been small and between-study heterogeneity has
been high, suggesting race-of-defendant bias is moderated by several variables. 316 After reviewing the literature, I hypothesized that
race-of-defendant bias was likely moderated by authoritarianism,
trust in the legal system, empathy, and explicit racial bias, 317 and I
formulated my voir dire questions accordingly. Linear probability
model four confirmed this hypothesis. The statistical results showed
that mock jurors who failed the voir dire questions were 18.3% to
18.4% more likely to sentence a Black defendant to death than a
White defendant ceteris paribus. 318
Finally, I hypothesized, based on an observational study published by Eberhardt and colleagues, that darkening the Black defendant’s eye color and complexion in one of the defendant treatments in this study would increase the likelihood that mock jurors
would sentence the defendant to death, particularly when the victim
was White. 319 I found no evidence to support this hypothesis.320
When interpreting these results, it is important to note that Eberhart
See supra Section IV.C.
See generally Devine & Caughlin, supra note 27, at 115–20 (reviewing
literature on race-of-defendant bias and reporting small effect sizes and high between-study heterogeneity).
317
See generally id. at 115 (reporting meta-analysis results of studies that
measured jury authoritarianism); Haney, supra note 16, at 1582–88 (discussing
the “empathic divide”); Racial Attitudes, supra note 192, at 1475–79 (discussing
the link between mock juror prejudice and punitiveness in the context of a capital
trial); Nature of Prejudice, supra note 142, at 524–25 (discussing the relationship
between measures of explicit juror prejudice and punitiveness in the context of a
non-capital trial).
318
See supra Section IV.E.
319
See Eberhardt et al., supra note 34, at 383.
320
See Section IV.C–E.
315
316
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and colleagues’ data was from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.321
While it is certainly possible that social norms have changed since
then, I think it is more probable that racial stereotyping is moderated
by a larger number of traits than complexion and eye color alone.
B.
The Death Qualification in Legal Context
The Supreme Court has addressed constitutional issues related
to the death qualification process several times. 322 In 1968, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court held that “a sentence of death cannot
be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen
by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or
religious scruples against its infliction.” 323 The Court emphasized
that “[c]ulled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital
punishment—of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty—such a jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority.” 324 In 1975, in a second line of decisions related to
juror selection, beginning with Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme
Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right to
a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community and established a prima facie fair cross-section test four years later in Duren
v. Missouri. 325
Many jurists interpreted Witherspoon to mean that jurors could
only be removed for cause if they made it unmistakably clear that
their views about the death penalty would prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict or cause them to automatically vote
against the death penalty. 326 In 1985, the Supreme Court addressed
this issue in Wainwright v. Witt, holding that a juror can be excused
for cause if his views about the death penalty “‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath,’” adding that the standard does
Eberhardt et al., supra note 34, at 384.
See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522–23
(1968).
323
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522.
324
Id. at 520.
325
Duren, 439 U.S. at 364; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
326
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 418–19 (1985).
321
322
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not require “unmistakable clarity.” 327 Shortly after the Wainwright
decision, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
death qualification violated the fair cross-section or the impartiality
requirements of Sixth Amendment in Lockhart v. McCree. 328 Specifically, the McCree Court addressed the respondent’s claims that
the death qualification violates the fair cross-section requirement by
removing Witherspoon-excludables and violates the impartiality requirement because it “tips the scales” towards death by over-representing conviction-prone jurors. 329
In addressing the fair cross-section claim, the McCree Court distinguished between removing jurors based on “shared attitudes that
render members of the group unable to serve as jurors,” which is
constitutionally permissible, versus removing jurors because they
are members of a “distinctive group,” which is constitutionally impermissible. 330 After finding that the death qualification does not violate the fair cross-section requirement because Witherspoon-excludables do not constitute a “distinctive group,” the Court turned to
McCree’s claim that the death qualification violated his Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury. 331 The McCree Court considered fifteen empirical studies, six of which it deemed relevant, but
only three of which it reviewed because the remaining three had
been rejected as too “tentative and fragmentary” by the Witherspoon
Court. 332 Assuming the empirical evidence established that deathqualified juries were more “conviction prone,” the McCree Court
held that this did not imply partiality because a conviction-prone juror can still “conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty
to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.” 333
Delivering the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned the external validity and ecological validity of the empirical
studies cited by the respondent and criticized them for failing to consistently consider the impact of jury deliberations and jury “nullifiers” (i.e., jurors who would refuse to find a defendant guilty
327
328
329
330
331
332
333

Id. at 424 (citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45–46 (1980)).
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986).
See id. at 167–84.
Id. at 176–77.
Id. at 174, 177.
Id. at 168–73.
Id. at 184.
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regardless of the evidence if death is a possible sentence). 334 Empirical methods have improved since the McCree decision and many of
the issues the Court noted can now be addressed methodologically. 335
In the past, studies of mock jury behavior relied primarily on
samples of college students. 336 Although many studies of college
students are consistent with studies of nonstudents, samples drawn
with internet-based survey tools, like the sample in this study, are
more diverse, representative, and generalize closely to nationally
representative studies, providing stronger support for their external
validity. 337 A variety of research also suggests that hypothetical and
Id. at 168–73. External validity refers to the extent that a study is statistically generalizable to a larger population. Brian H. Bornstein et al., Mock Juror
Sampling Issues in Jury Simulation Research: A Meta-Analysis, 41 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 13, 13 (2017). If survey participants are randomly drawn from a population (e.g., jury-eligible adults), their responses will mirror the views of that population more and more closely as the number of respondents surveyed increases
because the randomization will tend to capture a representative sample. See id. at
13. However, if respondents are drawn from a subgroup of a population (e.g.,
college students), their responses may not generalize well to the population of
interest (e.g., jury-eligible adults) because segments of the population of interest
are absent (e.g., jury-eligible adults who are not college students). See id. at 14–
15. Ecological validity refers to the extent that an experimental study provides a
realistic representation of what is being study. See id. at 14. For example, a mock
trial may not adequately capture the realism of an actual trial, and the decisions
made by mock jurors may not be comparable to jurors who are subjected to the
atmosphere of a real trial and are aware their decisions have consequences. See
id. As the McCree Court implied, omitting realistic elements of an actual trial-like
jury deliberations or a death qualification that removes nullifiers may harm the
ecological validity of mock juror research. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162,
168–73 (1986).
335
See generally Susan Athey & Guido W. Imbens, The State of Applied
Econometrics: Causality and Policy Evaluation, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 4 (2017)
(discussing recent developments in econometrics).
336
Bornstein et al., supra note 334, at 14.
337
See id. at 25 (“[t]here were relatively few differences on the outcome
measures when comparing community and college student samples”); Berinsky
et al., supra note 234, at 352 (“demographic characteristics of domestic MTurk
users are more representative and diverse than . . . student and convenience samples”); Coppock, supra note 234, at 614 (discussing “results from 15 replication
studies, showing that in large part, original findings are replicated on both convenience and probability samples” like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk); Clifford et
al., supra note 234, at 1 (“Overall, our results suggest that the same values and
334
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consequential decision-making often result in similar outcomes and
require similar thought processes, which supports the ecological validity of mock juror research. 338 It is equally important to emphasize,
as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in McCree, that it is hypocritical for courts to dismiss mock juror research as irrelevant to actual trials when the judiciary is the primary impediment preventing
researchers from studying juror behavior during trials. 339 Given the
judiciary’s reticence to allow researchers to study actual trials and
the obvious ethical issues with manipulating trial variables or seating multiple juries, mock jury research provides the best empirical
data available on juror decision-making. With respect to Justice
Rehnquist’s emphasis on jury deliberations, research conducted in
the wake of McCree shows that race-based punitive tendencies are
amplified, not muted, by jury deliberations. 340 Finally, it is possible
to differentiate between mock jurors who could fairly determine

personality traits that motivate ideological differences in the mass public also divide liberals and conservatives on MTurk.”).
338
See Min Jeong Kang et al., Hypothetical and Real Choice Differentially
Activate Common Valuation Areas, 31 J. NEUROSCI. 461, 467 (2011) (discussing
evidence that real and hypothetical decisions involve largely overlapping neural
processes); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Role Playing and the Study of Jury Behavior, 7
SOCIO. METHODS & RSCH. 337, 350–51 (1979) (finding mock jurors who thought
their decisions carried real consequences showed no differences in guilt and sentencing determinations, deliberation time, or applying a reasonable doubt criterion
than those who did not); Anton Kühberger et al., Framing Decisions: Hypothetical and Real, 89 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1162,
1163, 1170 (2002) (noting that “real decision making consists of imagining and
evaluating hypothetical options, and that this core process is the same for hypothetical decisions” and finding that “real and hypothetical decisions result in similar choices”). But see Martin F. Kaplan & Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under
the Control of Others Can Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 L. & PSYCH. REV. 1, 13
(1986) (reporting that mock jurors who thought their decisions carried real consequences were more likely to convict and more certain of the defendant’s guilt
than those who did not); David W. Wilson & Edward Donnerstein, Guilty or Not
Guilty? A Look at the “Simulated” Jury Paradigm, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 175,
177–81 (1977) (reporting mock jurors who were told a trial carried real consequences were more conviction prone than those who were not).
339
McCree, 476 U.S. at 189 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is the courts who
have often stood in the way of surveys involving real jurors and we should not
now reject a study because of this deficiency.”).
340
See, e.g., Lynch & Haney, supra note 263, at 92.
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guilt but would not recommend a death sentence and jurors who
would nullify a verdict, an issue that was central to McCree. 341
Research conducted in the wake of McCree, including this
study, shows strong empirical evidence that African Americans are
disproportionally underrepresented in death-qualified venires and
death-qualified jurors are more punitive in the guilt and sentencing
phases of a trial. 342 This disparity is constitutionally permissible under McCree because African Americans are disproportionately underrepresented due to their “shared attitudes” about capital punishment, not because they are Black. 343 The McCree Court also made
it clear that even if death-qualified jurors are more punitive in the
guilt or sentencing phases of a capital trial, this does not necessarily
imply they are biased. 344 However, in contrast to the empirical studies evaluated in McCree, the results presented here provide evidence
that the death qualification increases the chances of empaneling jurors who are not only more punitive but make racially biased sentencing decisions. 345
Although there is some ambiguity regarding whether the right to
an impartial jury applies to the sentencing phase of a trial, the Supreme Court’s recent holdings make it clear that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to establish aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt before a capital defendant can be sentenced to death,
which implies the Sixth Amendment’s impartiality requirement follows into the sentencing phase of a trial. 346 Unlike jurors who are
341
See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson et al., Race and Retribution: An Empirical
Study of Implicit Bias and Punishment in America, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839,
877–79 (2019).
342
See infra Appendix A. See generally, Lynch & Haney, supra note 278, at
148–49 (discussing research on the death qualification).
343
See McCree, 476 U.S. at 176–77.
344
See id. at 177–78.
345
See supra Part V.
346
See Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 94 (2016) (holding that a jury must make
all of the factual findings supporting a sentence beyond a reasonable doubt);
McCree, 476 U.S. at 196 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven where the role of the
jury at the penalty stage of a capital trial is limited to what is essentially a factfinding role, the right to an impartial jury established in Witherspoon bars the
State from skewing the composition of its capital juries . . . .”); Morgan v. Illinois,
504 U.S. 719, 740 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contrasting opinions that a jury
trial is not required at sentencing with cases that imply the impartiality
requirement applies to sentencing juries).
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naturally more punitive, jurors whose sentencing decisions are heavily influenced by the defendant’s race are not jurors who “conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to
the facts of the particular case,” even if they were selected from a
fair cross-section of the community.347
A state process, like the death qualification, that underrepresents
African Americans and overrepresents jurors who make racially biased sentencing decisions, merits renewed judicial scrutiny, especially in light of the Court’s recent emphasis on eliminating racial
bias from the criminal justice system. 348 Although a Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claim requires proof of discriminatory
state intent or purpose, which courts are loath to recognize, Sixth
Amendment challenges focus on outcomes, and state intent or purpose is irrelevant. 349 There is ample precedent that systematic exclusion of jurors does not require evidence of individualized prejudicial effects or a claimant’s membership in an excluded group in
order to shift the burden of justifying the relevant jury selection
methods to the state. 350 The Taylor Court also made it clear that
“[t]he right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational
grounds.” 351 To rebut a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section challenge, the state must show that the law in question “manifestly and
primarily” advances a “significant state interest.” 352
The scope of the Sixth Amendment is broader than the fair crosssection requirement alone, as both the Taylor and McCree Courts
emphasized. 353 If a court applies the Sixth Amendment principles
McCree, 476 U.S. at 184.
See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017) (“[B]latant
racial prejudice is antithetical to the functioning of the jury system and must be
confronted in egregious cases . . . .”).
349
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297–99 (1987) (discussing
Fourteenth Amendment claims and the associated “discriminatory purpose” requirements). See generally Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (discussing
differences between Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and Sixth Amendment challenges).
350
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493, 503 (1972); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946).
351
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534.
352
Duren, 439 U.S. at 367–68.
353
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530–31 (“Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from
a pool broadly representative of the community as well as impartial in a specific
case . . . . [T]he broad representative character of the jury should be maintained,
347
348
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used to analyze statistical evidence supporting a fair-cross section
claim in order to analyze statistical evidence that a state process violates the Sixth Amendment impartiality requirement, then the argument that the death qualification “manifestly and primarily” advances a legitimate state interest becomes more tenuous. 354 Although the purpose of the death qualification is to remove partial jurors, the results of this study and other research provide evidence
that the death qualification fails to “manifestly and primarily” advance this goal because while it may reduce the representation of
one class of purportedly partial jurors (i.e., jurors who would refuse
to sentence a defendant to death), it simultaneously increases the
representation of another class of clearly partial jurors (i.e., jurors
who make racist sentencing decisions). 355
There is also an inherent contradiction in championing the jury
as a “guard against the exercise of arbitrary power” and as an interlocutor of “the commonsense judgment of the community,” while
simultaneously claiming a significant state interest in removing any
prospective juror who would dare exercise that “commonsense judgment” and nullify a verdict or refuse to recommend a death sentence
for a widely held, socially acceptable reason. 356 There is simply no
legitimate state interest in the wholesale exclusion of anyone who
partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.” (citing Thiel, 328 U.S.
at 227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184
(1986) (“[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community is impartial . . . so long as the jurors can conscientiously
and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.” (emphasis added)).
354
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 367–69.
355
See generally Brooke Butler, Death Qualification and Prejudice: The Effect of Implicit Racism, Sexism, and Homophobia on Capital Defendants’ Right
to Due Process, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 857, 864–65 (2007) (reporting empirical
results showing death-qualified jurors had higher scores on a questionnaire assessing Modern Racism); Levinson et al., supra note 26, at 557–63 (reporting that
death-qualified jurors had significantly higher scores on the Modern Racism Scale
(p < 0.001)); Unnever & Cullen, supra note 226, at 1291 (“[T]he most robust
predictor of the degree to which Americans support the death penalty is our measure of white racism.”); James D. Unnever et al., Race, Racism, and Support for
Capital Punishment, 37 CRIME & JUST. 45, 50 (2008) (discussing the Black-White
racial divide in support for the death penalty and the higher rates of support for
the death penalty among racists in the U.S. and internationally).
356
See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
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might conscientiously object to the death penalty if “the proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a [body] truly representative of the community . . . .” 357 In the words of John Adams, “[i]t is not only [a juror’s]
right but his Duty . . . to find the Verdict according to his best Understanding, Judgment and Conscience, tho [sic] in Direct opposition to the Direction of the Court.” 358
Prior to the Civil War, conscientious objectors acquitted defendants who harbored runaway slaves. 359 More recently, civil rights advocates have encouraged jurors to nullify verdicts in the trials of
nonviolent African American offenders as an act of civil disobedience against a system that views incarceration as the primary means
of mitigating Black antisocial behavior. 360 Allowing the state to manipulate a jury pool to eliminate widespread, ethical viewpoints is
antithetical to the basic principles of trial by jury. 361 Courts do not
death-qualify juries in non-capital murder trials, drug-qualify juries
in drug trials, or fraud-qualify juries in fraud trials. Why is the state
given the unique privilege of mitigating nullification during jury selection in capital trials via the death qualification? The state decides
whether to pursue capital murder charges and should bear the risk
of nullification if the community objects. 362
Regardless of the hypocrisy of advocating for commonsense
judgment while simultaneously striking conscientious objectors, the
arbitrary racial distinctions drawn in McCree deserve critical reevaluation. The McCree Court treated “distinctive groups” and “shared
attitudes” as uncorrelated rather than highly interrelated concepts,
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
Note, Live Free and Nullify: Against Purging Capital Juries of Death Penalty Opponents, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2092, 2095 (2014) (citing John Adams, Diary
Notes, in LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel
eds., 1965)).
359
Id. at 2096.
360
See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in
the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995).
361
See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 192–93 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
362
See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 722 (1992); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 350 n.3 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court recognizes
that the prosecutor determines whether a case even will proceed to the penalty
phase. If the prosecutor does not pursue the death penalty, a mandatory sentence
of life imprisonment is imposed.”).
357
358
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using judicial code switching to create an illusory dichotomy based
on culturally decontextualized racial classifications. 363 Race is not
simply a phenotype. 364 Shared histories, cultures, ideologies, and attitudes define racial groups just as much, if not more than, phenotype. 365 The history of slavery, segregation, and racism are inextricably intertwined with Black identity in the United States. 366
Given the long, racist history of capital punishment, it is not surprising that survey data shows that opposition to the death penalty
has been consistently higher among African Americans than White
Americans. 367 Although there are ideological variations within racial groups just as there are phenotypic variations, and a single trait
is not diagnostic, courts should not be able to pick and choose the
elements that define what it means to be Black in America to accommodate the state. Discrimination against a “distinctive group”
based on “shared attitudes” that are culturally and historically linked
to that group is synonymous with discrimination that targets members of a distinctive group because of their racial identity. 368 When
race is viewed in cultural and historical context, rather than in a socio-cultural void, it becomes harder to deny that statistical evidence
showing that the death qualification systematically excludes African
Americans establishes a prima facie claim under Duren. 369
C.
Voir Dire as a Safeguard Against Racial Bias
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that “[t]he risk of
racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence”
McCree, 476 U.S. at 174–75.
See Audrey Smedley, “Race” and the Construction of Human Identity, 100
AM. ANTHROPOLOGY 690, 699 (1998) (“The social categories of ‘race’ have always encompassed more than mere physical similarities and differences.”).
365
See generally id. (discussing the interrelationship between race and identity).
366
See id. at 695–96.
367
See generally Michael Cholbi & Alex Madva, Black Lives Matter and the
Call for Death Penalty Abolition, 128 ETHICS 517–18 (2018) (discussing the
Black Lives Matter movements call for death penalty abolition and the widely
held view that capital punishment is part of the “war against Black people”);
Unnever et al., supra note 355, at 54–58 (discussing the Black-White racial divide
in support for the death penalty).
368
See McCree, 476 U.S. at 174.
369
See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
363
364
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and that “there is . . . a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected” in capital trials. 370 Although racially
motivated capital sentencing practices may not be as obvious in the
capital trials of today as they were in Moore v. Dempsey, Powell v.
Alabama, or Brown v. Mississippi, racism remains an insidious social force that continues to permeate the criminal justice system. Recently, in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Supreme Court took the
extraordinary step of piercing the no-impeachment rule, Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b), to allow courts to address the specter of
juror racism ex post, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial trial necessitates this drastic remedy when “racial animus
[is] a significant motivating factor in [a] juror’s vote to convict.” 371
In his dissenting opinion in Peña-Rodriguez, Justice Alito underscored the importance of addressing racial prejudice, writing that
“the Court is surely correct that even a tincture of racial bias can
inflict great damage on [the justice] system, which is dependent on
the public’s trust.” 372 Although the Peña-Rodriguez Court expanded
ex post judicial remedies, the majority also highlighted the need to
address racism ex ante with existing safeguards, including careful
voir dire and instructions to jurors to review the evidence, deliberate
together, and “reach a verdict in a fair and impartial way, free from
bias of any kind.” 373 Although prophylactic measures like voir dire
and jury instructions may help identify racially biased jurors, such
measures are a safeguard, not a panacea, and voir dire inquiry into
racial bias is not an absolute right. 374
In 1931, in Aldridge v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized the right of an African American capital defendant accused of
killing a White victim to question prospective jurors about racial
bias in voir dire. 375 More recently, in 1973, the Supreme Court held
in Ham v. South Carolina that denying a defendant, who was accused of drug possession and alleged his arrest was racially motivated, the right to question prospective jurors about racial bias in
voir dire violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
370
371
372
373
374
375

Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35, 41 (1986) (citation omitted).
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
Id. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 871 (majority opinion).
See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976).
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1931).
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Amendment. 376 Because some courts interpreted Ham more broadly
than others, the Supreme Court addressed the right to voir dire inquiry into racial bias again in 1976, in Ristaino v. Ross, and restricted the right to cases involving special circumstances. 377 In
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, the Supreme Court defined these
“special circumstances,” indicating that they were present for “violent criminal act[s] with a victim of a different racial or ethnic
group” from that of the defendant or when “external circumstances . . . indicate a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic
prejudice [would] influence the jury’s evaluation of the evidence.” 378 Finally, in Turner v. Murray, the Court recognized an unacceptable risk of racial bias infecting sentencing decisions in capital trials, which the Court emphasized is especially serious given the
broad discretion of juries to impose a death sentence and the grave
consequences of improper sentencing. 379
In this study, I described a generic robbery-turned-homicide and
identified racist mock jurors using voir dire questions. The jurors
who failed voir dire were 18.3% to 18.4% more likely to sentence a
Black defendant to death controlling for the race of the victim. 380
These results support the conclusion that there is a “reasonable possibility” that the “special circumstances” outlined in Rosales-Lopez,
and considered in the context of a capital trial in Turner, likely apply
in every capital case involving an African American defendant, irrespective of the race of the victim. 381 “[A]n [o]unce of [p]revention
is worth a [p]ound of [c]ure.” 382 Acknowledging that there is a “reasonable possibility” of bias infecting a capital trial and permitting
voir dire inquiry into racial bias offers a minimally intrusive means
of protecting a defendant’s constitutional rights. 383 This safeguard
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973).
Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597.
378
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 192–93 (1981).
379
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35–36 (1986).
380
See supra Table 7. Mock jurors who failed voir dire were significantly
more likely to sentence both the Black defendant of lighter complexion (Black
(Light): 18.3%, p = 0.012) and darker complexion (Black (Dark): 18.4%, p =
0.012) to death than the White defendant.
381
See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 192–94; Turner, 476 U.S. at 33.
382
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, ON PROTECTION OF TOWNS FROM FIRE (Feb. 4,
1735), reprinted in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, JANUARY 1, 1735,
THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1744, at 12–15 (Leonard W. Labree ed., 1961).
383
See Rosales-Lopez, 461 U.S. at 192–94.
376
377
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also has the potential to limit the need for the remedial measures
authorized in Peña-Rodriguez. 384
D.
The Dangers of Ignoring Explicit Racial Bias
Explicit racial bias is a major social problem in contemporary
America, not a relic of the past. In 2019, the FBI reported 7,314 hate
crimes marking the highest level recorded since 2008. 385 These
crimes involved planning, deliberation, and action. 386 They were not
the result of unconscious stereotypes or implicit racial bias. The
same year, 58% of Americans said, “race relations in the U.S. are
bad,” 65% said “it has become more common for people to express
racist or racially insensitive views since Trump was elected president,” 45% said expressing these views has become more acceptable, and 76% of African Americans reported they “have been treated
unfairly because of their race or ethnicity at least from time to
time.” 387
The Anti-Defamation League has also reported an alarming increase in “the distribution of racist, antisemitic and anti-LGBTQ fliers, stickers, banners and posters” in recent years. 388 The Department of Homeland Security has identified White supremacists as the
most pressing lethal threat among violent domestic extremists in the
U.S. 389 The recent renaissance of White nationalism and right-wing
extremism was perhaps punctuated most saliently by the storming
of the U.S. Capitol and the parading of anti-Semitic and racist
See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2019, at 1 (2020),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2019/topic-pages/incidents-and-offenses.pdf; FBI
Reports an Increase in Hate Crimes in 2019: Hate-Based Murders More than
Doubled, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.splcenter.org/news/
2020/11/16/fbi-reports-increase-hate-crimes-2019-hate-based-murders-moredoubled.
386
See FBI, supra note 385, at 6.
387
Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Race in America 2019, PEW RSCH. CTR.
4, 6, 13 (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019/04/09/
race-in-america-2019.
388
White Supremacist Propaganda Spikes in 2020, ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE, https://www.adl.org/white-supremacist-propaganda-spikes-2020 (last
visited Oct. 28, 2021).
389
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND THREAT ASSESSMENT
OCTOBER 2020, at 17–18 (2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_homeland-threat-assessment.pdf.
384
385
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symbols, including the Confederate battle flag, through the halls of
Congress on January 6, 2021. 390 Again, this was not the result of
implicit racial bias. The Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, the Three
Percenters, and similar fringe groups openly embrace explicitly racist views. 391
While it is the role of law enforcement to address extreme forms
of racial prejudice, racism poses a broader threat to the rule of law.
It is our role as academics, lawmakers, and jurists to recognize the
dangers of racial bias, maintain public trust in the legal system, and
prevent racism from undermining judicial processes. Working to
mitigate racial bias in the criminal justice system is unquestionably
important, but myopic focus on implicit bias, at the expense of explicit bias, is misguided. As Michael Selmi emphasized, “labeling
nearly all contemporary discrimination as implicit and unconscious”
absolves bad actors of responsibility and undermines remedial
measures because unconscious thoughts and actions are not legally
cognizable. 392 A linear march towards liberalism, inclusion, and understanding is not guaranteed. Explicit racial bias is intergenerationally obdurate—it festers and metastasizes when left unchecked and
continues to pose a significant social problem.
E.
Reforming Voir Dire
The Supreme Court has emphasized that screening for racial bias
in voir dire is especially important in a capital trial given the “complete finality of [a] death sentence.” 393 However, many scholars
question the basic viability of this safeguard, assuming few, if any,
prospective jurors will answer questions about racial bias truthfully. 394 For example, in a 1986 article, Albert Alschuler responded
to the Turner Court’s assertion that screening for racial bias in voir
dire was “‘minimally intrusive’” by arguing that it is also

Identifying Far-Right Symbols Seen at the U.S. Capitol Riot, WASH. POST
(Jan. 15, 2021, 2:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/
2021/far-right-symbols-capitol-riot/.
391
See id.
392
Selmi, supra note 37, at 193.
393
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986).
394
See generally Lee, supra note 37, at 846 (discussing view that jurors will
not answer voir dire questions inquiring into racial bias truthfully).
390
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“minimally useful” and describing the questioning that became the
focus of Turner as “patronizing.” 395
Due to concerns that racial animus could influence prospective
jurors in Turner’s trial, his counsel requested the following voir dire
question: “The defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member of the
Negro race. The victim, W. Jack Smith, Jr., was a white Caucasian.
Will these facts prejudice you against Willie Lloyd Turner or affect
your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the
evidence?” 396 As Alschuler emphasized, this question equated to
asking, “[a]re you a bigot?” 397 Unfortunately, the trial judge’s approach was worse. He simply asked, “whether any person was aware
of any reason why he could not render a fair and impartial verdict.” 398 Not surprisingly, all the venirepersons answered “No.” 399
The fact that 10.1% of respondents in this study openly admitted
to racial bias adds credence to the argument that it is possible to
inquire into racial bias with a few carefully crafted voir dire questions. 400 However, this should be interpreted with caution. Assuming that all the mock jurors in this study answered the voir dire questions truthfully, which they likely did not, the results of this study
suggest that even if voir dire was 80% successful at removing racially biased jurors, you would still expect to empanel a racially biased juror in 15.6% of capital trials. 401 Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that many prospective jurors are dishonest and the
physical environment of the courtroom and voir dire questioning
methods encourage this dishonesty. 402
It is important to acknowledge that I conducted the mock voir
dire in this study using a semi-anonymous survey. Confidential
Alschuler, supra note 37, at 160–61 (quoting Turner, 476 U.S. at 37).
Turner, 476 U.S. at 30–31 (citing Turner v. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d
36, 42 n.8 (Va. 1980)).
397
Alschuler, supra note 37, at 161.
398
Turner, 476 U.S. at 31.
399
Id.
400
See infra Appendix A.
401
See id.
402
See Suggs & Sales, supra note 288, at 246–47; see also Richard Seltzer et
al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 451, 452–453, 455–56
(1991) (discussing empirical literature on prospective juror dishonesty during voir
dire and presenting a study of 190 jurors—25% of whom did not admit they had
been a victim of a crime or had a family member who was a victim of a crime,
and 30% of whom had not admitted they knew a law enforcement officer).
395
396
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surveys, particularly computer-administered questionnaires, are
more likely to elicit truthful responses than in-person questioning. 403
Research shows that respondents questioned in the presence of others often alter their answers to comply with social norms and avoid
embarrassment. 404 Asking open-ended questions to an entire group
in a highly formalized setting that do not require a response are unlikely to elicit one due to the psychological pressure of group conformity, especially when the questions are asked by an authority figure like a judge. 405 Questioning jurors individually in a group setting
does not alleviate these problems. 406 In fact, psychologists often use
this method of questioning to study social conformity. 407
Many courts already use questionnaires in jury selection. 408 I
have received them—most recently by email. The results of this
study suggest that it would be wise to expand the use of questionnaires in voir dire. I recommend making voir dire questionnaires
semi-anonymous by using a juror number rather than a name and
focusing questions inquiring into bias against African American defendants on authoritarianism, trust in the legal system, empathy, and
fear of racial integration. While I am confident that incorporating
questionnaires into voir dire will improve juror candor and expanded use of jury instructions on implicit and explicit bias will help
mitigate racism, using the full gamut of judicial tools to strike biased
jurors is equally essential.
Problems with prospective juror dishonesty are compounded by
the fact that prospective jurors are often still empaneled, even after
admitting to biases. 409 This is almost certainly a mistake. As early
Hans & Jehle, supra note 260, at 1198–99; Roger Tourangeau & Ting Yan,
Sensitive Questions in Surveys, 133 PSYCHOL. BULL. 859, 863 (2007); Timo
Gnambs & Kai Kaspar, Disclosure of Sensitive Behaviors Across Self-Administered Survey Modes: A Meta-Analysis, 47 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1237, 1238,
1252 (2015).
404
Suggs & Sales, supra note 288 at 259–61; Hans & Jehle, supra note 260,
at 1194–98.
405
Suggs & Sales, supra note 288, at 258–61.
406
Id.
407
Id. at 260.
408
See, e.g., Jury Managers’ Manual, FLA. CTS., https://www.flcourts.org/
content/download/219266/file/manual.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2021); Juror
Questionnaire for Criminal Cases, CA. CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/jury002.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
409
See Cosper, supra note 289, at 1471–77 (discussing juror rehabilitation).
403
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as 1807, in United States v. Burr, the Court articulated the implied
bias doctrine indicating that a juror “may declare that he feels no
prejudice in the case; and yet the law cautiously incapacitates him
from serving on the jury because it suspects prejudice, because in
general persons in a similar situation would feel prejudice.” 410 In
1936, in United States v. Wood, the Court held that “[t]he [Sixth]
Amendment prescribes no specific tests. The bias of a prospective
juror may be actual or implied; that is, it may be bias in fact or bias
conclusively presumed as matter of law.” 411 It follows that a “determination of implied bias . . . is not controlled by sincere and credible
assurances by the juror that he can be fair.” 412
Both the Burr and Wood Courts defined evidence of prejudice
in notably probabilistic terms like suspicion or presumption. 413 Empirical evidence, including the results of this study, show that people
with racially biased views are likely to make racially biased decisions based on those views. 414 As the NAACP and the Legal Defense and Education Fund noted in their amicus brief to the PeñaRodriguez Court, there “‘are some extreme situations that would justify a finding of implied bias.’” 415 Removing partial jurors is “exactly the sort of ‘extreme’ situation” the doctrine was intended to
address and would allow trial courts broader scope to address the
issues that led to Peña-Rodriguez and to the extremely troubling
facts of Tharpe v. Ford. 416 Although there are questions regarding
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936).
412
Brooks v. Dretke, 418 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 2005).
413
Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 50; Wood, 229 U.S. at 138.
414
See generally Racial Attitudes, supra note 192 at 1480–84 (discussing results that show mock jurors with explicitly racist views were more punitive towards Black capital defendants); Nature of Prejudice, supra note 142, 524–25
(discussing results that show mock jurors with explicitly racist views were more
punitive towards Black criminal defendants); Butler, supra note 355, at 859, 861,
865 (reporting empirical results showing death-qualified jurors had higher scores
on a questionnaire assessing Modern Racism); Levinson et al., supra note 26, at
559, 564 (discussing results that show mock jurors with explicitly racist views
were more punitive towards Black capital defendants when the victim is White).
415
Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. at
19–20, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (citing Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
416
Id. at 20. See generally Tharpe v. Ford, 139 S. Ct. 911, 913 (2019) (statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of certiorari). Justice Sotomayor
discussed the “truly striking evidence of juror bias” in the trial of Keith Leroy
410
411
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whether the implied bias doctrine is clearly established law, numerous courts have relied on it in a variety of contexts. 417 In the words
of Judge Price from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, “I am here
to attest that the implied bias doctrine does exist. I know it does; I
have seen it.” 418 Combating racism in the criminal justice system on
a macro scale will require the judiciary to recognize that statistical
evidence of generalized bias often indicates there is a high probability of individualized bias in a specific trial. The implied bias doctrine
provides a powerful judicial tool and a viable way to incorporate
statistical evidence into judicial decision-making. Perhaps it is time
to dust it off.
CONCLUSION
This article reports the results of one of the largest studies of
mock juror capital sentencing decisions conducted to date and provides compelling evidence that racially biased jurors make racially
biased sentencing decisions. After exploring the role that historical
socio-legal forces played in defining race and shaping crime and
punishment in the United States in Part I, I reviewed empirical literature on juror decision-making in Part II. As reported in Part III, I
randomly assigned mock jurors to treatment groups with the race of
the defendant and the race of victim varied in a 3 × 3 experimental
design. I death qualified mock jurors, asked them to determine sentencing after reading a description of a robbery-turned-homicide,
asked voir dire questions, and collected demographic information. I
hypothesized that jurors who failed voir dire questions focused on
authoritarianism, trust in the legal system, empathy, and explicit racial bias, would make racially biased sentencing decisions.
I estimated four linear probability models in Part IV and conducted post-hoc Monte Carlo simulations to contextualize the results. The statistical models did not show evidence of race-ofTharpe, a man who was sentenced to death by at least one unabashedly racist juror
who “‘wondered if black people even have souls.’” Id. (citations omitted).
417
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10–12, Uranga v. Davis, No. 18-6899
(5th Cir. Nov. 20, 2018) (discussing Circuit Court split and various applications
of the implied bias doctrine); Uranga v. State, 330 S.W.3d 301, 309 n.10 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (listing Circuit Courts that have “accepted the Sixth Amendment implied bias doctrine without qualification”).
418
Uranga, 330 S.W.3d at 308 (Price, J., dissenting).
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defendant or race-of-victim bias for the full death-qualified venire,
and I found no evidence that darkening a Black defendant’s complexion and eye color affected punitiveness in sentencing. However,
mock jurors who failed the voir dire questions showed strong raceof-defendant sentencing bias. These mock jurors were 18.3% to
18.4% more likely to sentence an African American defendant to
death than a White defendant based on his race alone. Monte Carlo
simulations showed that the death qualification increased the probability of empaneling one or more of these racially biased mock jurors from 72.1% to 78.1%, raising the relative risk by 8.4%.
In Part V, I argue that the death qualification is unconstitutional.
The results of this study provide evidence that the death qualification violates an African American defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury by increasing the probability of empaneling
jurors that make racially biased sentencing decisions. There is also
no legitimate state interest in removing nullifiers from a jury pool
who hold a widely embraced, ethical viewpoint like opposition to
the death penalty. 419 Continuing to allow the state to death qualify
juries is particularly troubling because in addition to overrepresenting racially biased jurors, the death qualification underrepresents
African American jurors because they oppose the death penalty at
much higher rates than White Americans. 420 Striking members of a
racial group based on ideological beliefs linked to their racial identity is synonymous with striking them because of their racial identity
and should be critically reevaluated in light of fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. My empirical results also support the conclusion that the “special circumstances” that trigger the
right to inquire into juror racial bias during voir dire, as defined in
Ristaino and further articulated Rosales-Lopez and Turner, are
likely present in all capital cases involving an African American defendant, regardless of the victim’s race.
If the Supreme Court is committed to mitigating racism in capital trials on a broad scale, it should reassess the constitutionality of
the death qualification. More broadly, the judiciary should increase
the use of questionnaires in voir dire, provide jury instructions on
explicit and implicit bias, closely scrutinize prospective jurors who
self-report biases, end the practice of rehabilitating jurors who give
419
420

See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S 167, 172–73 (1986).
See Unnever & Cullen, supra note 226, at 1281.
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assurances they can be impartial after admitting to bias, and strike
jurors when racial bias can reasonably be implied.
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APPENDIX B
I asked mock jurors the following disqualifying questions and
removed mock jurors from the study who reported they had been
convicted of a felony, were facing felony charges, were non-citizens, or were under 18:
1.

Have you ever been convicted of a felony, or
are you currently facing felony charges? Yes
or No?

2.

Are you a United States citizen? Yes or No?

3.

How old are you?

After asking disqualifying questions, I asked mock jurors a series of demographic questions:
1.

Which option best describes your political
views? Conservative, Moderate, or Liberal?

2.

What’s your expected pre-tax income for
2020? Less than $25,000, $25,000-$49,999,
$50,000-$74,999, More than $75,000?

3.

Which option best describes your sex? Male
or Female?

4.

Are you religious? Yes or No?

5.

What state are you from?

6.

Which best describes your education? Less
than High School, Some College, College
Degree, Graduate Degree?

7.

Which best describes you? Black, White,
Hispanic or Latino, Asian, or Other?

8.

What’s 10+4? 14, 12, 5, 7?

9.

Which option best describes your political
views? Conservative, Moderate, or Liberal?
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I randomized the question order (except for questions 1, 8, and
9), randomized the response order for nominal responses, included
question 8 to eliminate survey respondents who were answering
without reading the questions, and repeated question 1 as question 9
to eliminate anyone who did not answer consistently.
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APPENDIX C
I ran two multinomial logistic regressions to assess the effectiveness of the random assignment of study participants to the victim
(Table C-1) and defendant treatment (Table C-2) groups. I found no
evidence of significant imbalances (all p-values > 0.05).
TABLE C-1
MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION REGRESSING VICTIM
TREATMENTS ON DEFENDANT TREATMENTS AND DEMOGRAPHIC
VARIABLES
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TABLE C-2
MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION REGRESSING DEFENDANT
TREATMENTS ON VICTIM TREATMENTS AND DEMOGRAPHIC
VARIABLES.
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APPENDIX D
TABLE D-1
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL TWO: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES

FIGURE D-1
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL TWO: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES

TABLE D-2
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL TWO: SIMPLE EFFECTS
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APPENDIX E
TABLE E-1
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL THREE: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES

FIGURE E-1
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL THREE: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES

TABLE E-2
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL THREE: SIMPLE EFFECTS
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APPENDIX F
TABLE F-1
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL FOUR: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES

FIGURE F-1
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL FOUR: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES

TABLE F-2
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL FOUR: SIMPLE EFFECTS

